[Wang Son-taek] How to make Carney’s appeal work

Prime Minister of Canada Mark Carney’s recent speech in Davos, Switzerland, has attracted remarkable global attention. It has become a focal point for discussion among diplomats, policymakers and scholars alike. In an era defined by geopolitical uncertainty, such engagement itself is meaningful. Carney’s message, a forceful critique of America’s disruptive behavior, a principled defense of the liberal international order, and a call for greater responsibility from middle powers, speaks directly to the anxieties of our time.

I largely agree with the direction of his argument. The rules-based international system is under severe strain. Unilateral actions, transactional diplomacy and open challenges to multilateral norms are eroding predictability and trust. In this context, middle powers can and should play a stabilizing role, both normatively and institutionally. Middle powers matter not because they can replace great powers, but because they can shape incentives, norms and coordination at moments of systemic stress. Yet persuasive rhetoric and moral satisfaction do not automatically yield effective solutions. While Carney’s speech is intellectually stimulating, it does not create solutions. Several essential components are missing, and his appeal risks remaining inspirational rather than operational.

The first missing element is a deeper examination of why US President Donald Trump has been able to pursue such aggressive policies, domestically and internationally. Trump did not emerge in a vacuum. His political resilience reflects accumulated frustrations that long predate his presidency. Without identifying these root causes, calls to defend the liberal order will struggle to resonate beyond elite circles.

At the heart of the problem lies the long-term side effects of neoliberal globalization. For decades, free trade, deregulation and multilateral economic integration expanded global output and efficiency. However, the gains from globalization were distributed unevenly. Both globally and within national societies, inequality widened, regional disparities deepened, and middle-class security eroded. This imbalance created fertile ground for political backlash. Communities that experienced job losses, wage stagnation and social dislocation felt abandoned by policymakers who continued to champion globalization as an unquestionable good. The challenges surrounding illegal immigration are also closely tied to this broader neoliberal framework. Economic openness, without adequate social and regulatory safeguards, generated political vulnerability.

Neoliberalism itself is not inherently flawed, but it clearly requires modification. A limited, targeted use of tariffs and regulatory tools to manage the global movement of goods, capital and labor should no longer be dismissed as protectionist heresy. Readjusting the system is not a retreat from openness; it is a prerequisite for sustaining it. Ignoring structural causes while condemning populist outcomes only guarantees that political frustration will intensify rather than subside.

The second omission concerns American domestic politics, particularly the failure to confront uncomfortable realities. Trump has effectively tapped into public dissatisfaction over immigration, inflation, fiscal deficits and persistent trade imbalances. His approach is often crude and destabilizing, but he acknowledges the existence of problems and claims to act decisively. By contrast, the Democratic Party has been reluctant to accept responsibility for policy shortcomings. Too often, voter anger is treated as a misunderstanding, misinformation or moral failure rather than a legitimate expression of discontent. This reluctance undermines credibility. The path toward political restoration in the United States must begin with a candid acknowledgment of past errors, followed by the presentation of credible alternative solutions, and only then sustained criticism of Trump’s methods.

Without such self-reflection, opposition to Trump risks appearing detached and elitist. Political legitimacy cannot be rebuilt through condemnation alone; it requires engagement with lived economic and social realities. Carney’s speech touches on America’s disruptive role, but it does not effectively address the internal issues that are central to understanding Trump’s endurance.

The third missing element lies in the international response to American unilateralism. Trump’s tariff-driven, self-interested diplomacy undeniably disrupts the liberal international order. However, European countries and other middle powers must also confront an uncomfortable truth: They have not fully shared the burden of maintaining that order. For many decades, the United States provided security guarantees, open markets and institutional leadership at considerable cost. While criticism of Washington’s excesses is understandable, it must be accompanied by recognition of past contributions. More importantly, it should be followed by tangible commitments to cooperate in preserving legitimate US interests alongside global stability.

Normative appeals alone are unlikely to persuade American voters who increasingly question the value of international leadership. Moral lectures without material responsibility only deepen transatlantic and transpacific resentment. Middle powers cannot expect the United States to act as system manager indefinitely while offering limited reciprocal support. If Carney’s appeal is to gain real traction, three substantive shifts are required.

First, the international community must initiate a serious debate on reforming neoliberal institutions. This does not mean dismantling the system, but recalibrating it. Absolute freedom of movement for goods, capital and labor has proven politically unsustainable. Managed openness, guided by social stability, must replace ideological rigidity.

Second, the US Democratic Party must openly acknowledge that it failed to respond adequately to voter concerns and must fundamentally rethink its policy approach. Without this reckoning, Trumpism will remain resilient, regardless of how sharply it is criticized inside and outside of the US.

Third, middle powers must move beyond rhetorical support for liberal norms. They should explicitly express appreciation for America’s historical role and demonstrate sincere cooperation in safeguarding US interests while jointly defending global rules and institutions.

There is a profound irony here. If these three conditions were met, Trump would lose much of the domestic and international justification for his self-defeating policies. The grievances that sustain his political appeal would weaken, and the demand for disruptive leadership would diminish. Undoubtedly, Carney’s speech is a valuable contribution to the global conversation. But persuasion alone is not enough. What this moment demands is not only moral clarity, but also political realism and shared responsibility. Only then can the liberal international order move from a period of retreat to a credible process of renewal.

Wang Son-taek

Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.