Unknowns lurk even as Harris portends continuity, deepening of alliance

Experts predict a potential Harris administration will continue measures started under Biden to bolster security and extended deterrence, but cautioned circumstances could compel Washington to pressure Seoul in ways that could stress their alliance.

U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris stands at military observation post as she visits the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas, in Panmunjom, South Korea, on Sept. 29, 2022. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

With less than two weeks remaining before Americans choose the next occupant of the White House, U.S. Democratic Party candidate and Vice President Kamala Harris has dropped only a few hints about her approach to the Korean Peninsula in the lead-up to the election.

One instance was her August nomination acceptance speech at the Democratic Party’s national convention in Chicago, where Harris proclaimed she — unlike Republican candidate and former President Donald Trump — would not “cozy up” to dictators such as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

However, South Korean observers were alarmed to discover her party’s 92-page platform did not mention denuclearizing North Korea as one of its policy goals under Harris, who, before her vice presidency, served as attorney general of California from 2011 to 2017 and as the state’s junior senator from 2017 to 2021.

Colin Kahl, a former undersecretary of defense for policy who participated in the drafting of the Democratic platform, later clarified that denuclearization would remain Washington’s policy objective under Harris, but noted that her “near-term priority” if elected president would be bolstering joint deterrence with Seoul and Tokyo since experts “don’t see an imminent prospect” of Pyongyang abandoning its nuclear weapons.

The omission of denuclearization as a goal may indeed be an oversight as all of the experts who spoke to the Korea JoongAng Daily invoked the same word to describe a potential Harris administration in relation to current U.S. President Joe Biden: continuity.

━ Carrying the torch

Over the past three years, the Biden administration has sought to assuage Seoul’s concerns about the lack of progress in disarming North Korea — and rein in South Korean voices calling for nuclear armament — by establishing new bilateral mechanisms to bolster Washington’s extended deterrence commitment and regularly deploying U.S. strategic assets to the peninsula.

Prof. Lee Na-kyung, who teaches political science and international relations at Seoul National University, says South Koreans “are likely to see continuity between Harris’s policies and measures undertaken by the Biden administration,” such as the Washington Declaration and the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), which she describes as “giving South Korea some assurance that the United States cares about maintaining security and deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.”

Dr. Lee Sang-soo, an associate fellow at the European Center for North Korea Studies at the University of Vienna and one of the founders of Strategic Linkages consultancy based in Stockholm, similarly predicts that Harris “would likely continue to place a strong emphasis on extended deterrence” and “build on existing frameworks to reassure South Korea of the U.S. commitment to its defense” and “temper its own nuclear ambitions.”

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, left, shakes hands with U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland on April 25, 2023, during his state visit to the United States. [KANG JEONG-HYUN]

According to Prof. Lee, “nuanced differences” between Harris’s policies and Biden’s toward the alliance may emerge depending on who is appointed secretary of state, whom she notes is the officeholder in Washington that traditionally has had the biggest impact on U.S. foreign policy.

“A more progressive candidate for secretary of state, such as Sen. Chris Murphy, might bring more concern for human rights to relations with both foes like North Korea and also U.S. allies that don’t have good human rights records,” she says while noting that “a more bipartisan candidate, such as CIA Director Bill Burns, might differentiate Harris’s foreign policy from Biden’s because he is a seasoned diplomat who served under both George W. Bush and Barack Obama and is skilled at navigating quagmires such as the ongoing conflicts worldwide.”

━ No love lost with Kim Jong-un

Experts also agree that Harris, like Biden, won’t be rushing to hold summits with Kim as did Trump, nor do they believe that Pyongyang will change its tune about not engaging with Washington after the election.

“Harris almost certainly wouldn’t meet with Kim because she would require credible progress on denuclearization to be negotiated at the working level before a summit,” says Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University, who notes Kim’s “apparent sense of betrayal” after his 2019 Hanoi summit with Trump collapsed without a deal makes it “unclear whether he’d be willing to reengage in leader-level diplomacy.”

U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris tours the truce village of Panmunjom inside the demilitarized zone on Sept. 29, 2022. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

During her visit to Seoul and the demilitarized zone in September 2022, Harris reaffirmed the U.S. goal of the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in talks with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, where she also called the two countries’ alliance a “linchpin” of regional and global security.

While Prof. Lee believes Harris “is likely to maintain Biden’s approach of being open to dialogue with Pyongyang,” she also says it is “unlikely” Harris will “engage in a Trump-style leadership summit with Kim or use longstanding cornerstones of the alliance, such as the U.S. military presence in South Korea, as leverage in negotiations with North Korea.”

Given Washington’s prolonged failure to rein in Pyongyang’s development of illicit weapons, Dr. Lee suggests Harris might try and undertake a “more pragmatic strategy” of “incremental engagement and possibly offering selective concessions, such as lifting sanctions, in exchange for North Korea’s gradual denuclearization.”

━ Facing mounting challenges together

Harris is very likely to face more pressure than Biden to change the U.S. approach to North Korea in light of developments during his presidency.

These include presumed quantitative and qualitative improvements in the regime’s nuclear and missile arsenals, its proclamation of a nuclear weapons doctrine that allows their offensive use, the regime’s deployment of troops to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and its constitutional designation of South Korea as a “hostile state” that needs to be subjugated.

“North Korea’s capabilities are growing, and the country is becoming more belligerent and willing to be involved in matters outside of the region. This means that we have to stop thinking about North Korea only as an isolated, rogue threat and start thinking about it as an international collaborator that could potentially cause broader harm,” says Naoko Aoki, a political scientist at the Virginia-based think tank RAND.

According to Aoki, a potential Harris administration may thus be motivated to make “bolder changes to the current policy” and “will likely have to work even more closely with South Korea” to “not only deter North Korea’s military adventurism in the region, but also think of ways to work together so that North Korean actions do not create challenges in the broader international arena.”

Considering the North’s stonewalling of U.S. efforts at engagement, Aoki also cautions that “if North Korea responds to any calls for dialogue, it will likely be because it thinks it can negotiate from a position of strength” — a sentiment that was shared by Prof. Lee, who says the North “would expect significant concessions before even starting talks again.”

U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris, center, salutes a U.S. Army officer and South Korean interpreting officer as she wraps up her visit to Panmunjom inside the demilitarized zone on Sept. 29, 2022. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

While Pyongyang has repeatedly called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and military assets from the Korean Peninsula in past negotiations, experts agree such changes are unlikely under a Harris presidency.

“Harris would not seek drastic changes to troop levels in South Korea, as the U.S. military presence is critical for regional deterrence against North Korea,” says Dr. Lee, who also said the vice president, if elected, “would likely maintain the current structure of the alliance, including cost-sharing agreements like the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) that was renegotiated under Biden.”

Likewise, Prof. Lee characterizes the U.S. military presence and deployment of strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula as “fundamental pillars that, if changed, would undermine the South Korea-U.S. alliance.”

“I don’t see any sign that Harris is going to waver significantly on any of these issues,” she says, adding that the vice president is “also unlikely to push South Korea to pay more toward the upkeep on the alliance, though questions about the fairness of current cost-sharing could later render increased contributions by Seoul a practical and realistic possibility.”

━ Multilateralism against multifaceted threats

Harris’s probable approach to Washington’s alliance with Seoul also encapsulates what experts describe as her general preference for maintaining and deepening cooperation with U.S. allies.

“Harris has generally described herself as a strong supporter of multilateral cooperation and close collaboration with U.S. allies,” such as NATO and Ukraine, says Aoki, who adds she would be “surprised to see a dramatic change in this general policy direction.”

Her view of the vice president’s approach toward Washington’s alliances is shared by Prof. Lee, who says Biden is “distinguished” by his emphasis on working with allies and that Harris, as a member of his administration, “likely takes the same views about joint security cooperation with Seoul and Tokyo as well as within the Aukus and Quad frameworks,” in addition to multilateral coordination to shore up supply chain resilience and safeguard access to critical resources and advanced technology.

U.S. President Joe Biden, center, greets South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, left, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, right, at Camp David in Maryland on Aug. 18, 2023 [AP/YONHAP]

According to Dr. Lee, such wide-ranging collaboration with U.S. allies would not only be aimed at “counterbalancing and containing China in Northeast Asia,” but also at “reinforcing sanctions and diplomatic pressure to curb Russia’s support for North Korea’s military capabilities.”

In the same vein, Easley suggests Harris “might look to increase the involvement of European countries in dealing with North Korea,” which he says “could include expanding contingency planning, sanctions enforcement, and efforts at restarting dialogue to at least avoid military escalation.”

━ Unknown variables

Just as U.S. foreign policy could change under a potential Harris administration to reflect changes in the security environment on the Korean Peninsula over the past four years, experts believe circumstances could compel the United States to apply pressure on South Korea in ways that could stress their alliance.

“Although the United States might expect more active engagement from allies in ongoing conflicts around the world, these expectations might be tempered by the diversity of voices in a democracy such as South Korea,” says Prof. Lee, who notes that despite the current Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s “proclivity for closer alignment with Washington,” Seoul is also “wary of entanglement abroad that could threaten business interests.”

U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris, left, and Speaker of the House of Representatives Kevin McCarthy, right, applaud as South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol addresses a joint session of Congress in Washington on April 27, 2023. [YONHAP]

Seoul has resisted pressure to send arms directly to Kyiv, opting instead to sell weapons to countries that provide Ukraine with their existing stocks of South Korean defense systems and ammunition.

Further, South Korea was slow to disengage economically from Russia due to its dependence on exports, which Prof. Lee says “will likely affect decisions regarding China as well,” especially in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.

Looking to the future, Aoki says, “It’s difficult to make judgments about Harris’s foreign policy in the region, but how her potential administration will deal with North Korea will likely be affected by other foreign policy priorities, including the Israel-Hamas conflict, the Russia-Ukraine war and the U.S. competition with China.”

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]