The lead-up to the war in Ukraine

Nothing comes free in
diplomacy — and actions speak louder than words. The time has come for us to show a cool-headed survival instinct.

Lee Jae-seungThe author is a professor of international studies at Korea University and head of the Ilmin International Relations Institute. The Ukrainian war is entering its third winter, but there is no end in sight. European countries have started to search for an exit from the war while looking back on the lead-up to it, which started in February 2022 with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. First of all, why couldn’t Europe prevent this war?

France and Germany failed to read Russia’s intention to expand its territory. In her 2023 book “Les Aveuglés” (“The Blind” in English), author Sylvie Kauffmann, a columnist for Le Monde, revisits the process leading up to the Ukraine war and argues that French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel helped open a path to the war rather than preventing it. She presents a piercing diagnosis of their naivety: They thought that dialogue and economic interdependence would guarantee peace. But they were wrong. After ignoring other European countries’ forewarnings repeatedly, the worst came quickly.

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Europe’s geopolitics were already in a Cold War phase with a broad array of sanctions implemented on Russia. However, Europe adhered to maintaining international relations based on the principle of dialogue. In particular, France and Germany with their substantial leadership in the old continent worshipped the principle. On the other hand, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as Eastern European countries, including Poland, kept sounding the alarm about Russia’s expansionist move.

French presidents always wanted to create a new security order in Europe, following a unique characteristic of France which often cherishes grand visions. Historically, building a close relationship with Russia was Europe’s long-coveted goal. France also had a diplomatic tradition of “not humiliating Russia.”

At the beginning of his term in 2017, French President Macron invited Russian President Vladimir Putin to the Palace of Versailles. The young new president had a craving for a new order in Europe based on security and trust between Europe and Russia out of his strong conviction that France could tie Russia to Europe.

Just a few days before the G7 summit in August 2019, Macron again invited Putin to the Fort de Brégançon in the beautiful Côte d’Azur region — also known as the French Riviera — in southern France. The bilateral meeting was soon followed by a “Normandy Format” 2+2 summit in Paris among France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine in December. Macron’s attempt to confirm Russia’s goodwill through the rendezvous in Paris ended with confirming a yawning gulp between Putin and the new Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Eastern European countries watched this process with skepticism. They still felt uneasy about whether the security interests of France and Germany — the axis of the European Union (EU) — would align with their own interests. Russia already showed tangible signs of taking an internally-repressive, externally-expansionist and status quo-breaking path.

Germany was confident that it could contain Russia through dialogue and economic ties. Berlin thought that economic interdependence would bring about political interdependence. “Wandel durch Handel,” or “Change through trade,” was a long tradition of German diplomacy and the foundation of Ostpolitik.

Although they were weakened after the annexation of Crimea, the economic and technological ties between Germany and Russia were still strong. The completion in 2011 of the Nord Stream 1 — the first natural gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea to encourage Russia to supply its gas to Germany — was followed by the construction of the Nord Stream 2 which was completed in December 2021. The construction was a priority project for Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Russia was closely linked to the European market at the time. Merkel’s deep understanding of Eastern Europe and her amicable relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin during her four terms as the chancellor also gave her more confidence in dialogue. At the G7 summit in Carbis Bay, England, on June 11-13, 2021, Merkel insisted that “Europe’s relationship with Moscow must continue, just as it did during the Cold War.”

France and Germany planned to propose a summit with Putin at the European Council Summit on June 24-25, 2021. While attending her last European Council summit, Chancellor Merkel proposed first. “Russia sees us as an enemy. I have no illusions. But we must talk to President Putin […] We are being threatened, but we are not using the dialogue mechanism.” President Macron joined the chorus. “As direct stakeholders [in the Ukraine war], we cannot just passively watch the talks between the United States and Russia.”

But the proposals were immediately met with opposition from the representative of a small Baltic state, as they hadn’t go through coordination with other European Union (EU) members in advance. Kaya Kallas, the new prime minister of Estonia, asked what the summit was about and what the goal was. “We have always said that we will not hold a summit until Putin gives up Crimea. The condition has not been met yet. How will we look? We will end up showing our own words are worthless,” she said.

In the end, the proposal for a summit between the EU and Putin was rejected. The Estonian prime minister with the audacity to confront the German chancellor will take office as the new High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Affairs and Vice President of the Commission this coming December.

If an EU-Putin summit had been held, could it have prevented the war? We can hardly give an optimistic answer. The war in Ukraine has shattered Europe’s faith in peace through dialogue and economic exchange. The persistent warnings from Eastern European countries came true. The grand picture of a new European security system, including Russia, vanished, too. The key players in European diplomacy — who failed to decipher Putin’s expansionist worldview and instead expected goodwill from Russia — swiftly turned to a hard-line stance toward Moscow.

The situations in Europe and Northeast Asia are no different, as both are dealing with counterparts with different systems and ideologies. In contrast to Europe who has its single enemy of Russia, Northeast Asia has many countries which are interconnected with North Korea, Russia and China in their own way. The North’s nuclear and missile threats are also growing. These are authoritarian states with distinctly different worldviews.

Despite a slight abatement in their economic connectivity, South Korea, the United States and Japan all have close economic ties with China. There are also calls for restoring dialogue channels with China, Russia and North Korea to help ease tensions and maintain economic relations at various levels. As diplomacy begins with dialogue, it would be foolish to reject dialogue. But the international situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula is too harsh to ensure peace through dialogue alone. Economic interdependence cannot guarantee peace, either. Above all, are we accurately deciphering the real intentions of North Korea, Russia and China?

In his 2022 book “Les autres ne pensent pas comme nous,” or “Others don’t think like us” in English, author Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, a veteran French diplomat, points to the dangers of an ethnocentric view. The belief that one’s values and political system are common prevents one from seeing the other party’s actual intentions and worldview. The other party doesn’t think and act as one expects. The ability to think from the other side’s perspective and empathize with it is essential in the world of diplomacy.

The angles of European intellectuals who revisit the lead-up to the Ukraine war have significant implications for South Korea. First of all, trust comes at a price. It is extremely dangerous to rely on the goodwill of an authoritarian state. In an uncertain international order, what ensures a country’s security is its military power, economic capacity and an ironclad alliance. But nothing comes free in diplomacy — and actions speak louder than words. The time has come for us to show a cool-headed survival instinct. Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.