Trump 2.0 could bring Korea plenty of security risks, but also opportunities

South Korea is apprehensive about the possible re-election of Donald Trump due to potential risks his return may pose to the Seoul-Washington alliance and its ability to cope with North Korea's escalating nuclear and missile threats.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, and then U.S. President Donald Trump shake hands at Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone on June 30, 2019. [AP/YONHAP] [AP/YONHAP]

As the U.S. presidential election approaches, the potential impact of its results in the Indo-Pacific is nowhere more pronounced than on the Korean Peninsula — the world’s only remaining divided nation and a critical region located next to the United States’ primary global competitor, China.

South Korea, whose only treaty ally is the United States, is apprehensive about the possible re-election of Donald Trump, the former U.S. president and current Republican nominee, due to potential risks his return may pose to the alliance and its ability to cope with North Korea’s escalating nuclear and missile threats.

During his presidency from 2017 to 2021, Trump demanded that South Korea increase its contributions to the cost of stationing U.S. troops fivefold and even threatened a troop withdrawal.

His recent remarks referring to South Korea as a “very wealthy country” and a “money machine” suggest that, if elected, he may again push for greater financial contributions, raising fears of a rift in the longstanding alliance.

Trump’s top-down approach to diplomacy, particularly his preference for direct negotiations with adversaries like North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, also sparks concern.

He has expressed a desire to meet Kim again, potentially bypassing Seoul in talks that could impact the region’s security.

Some fear that Trump could recognize North Korea as a de facto nuclear state and prioritize arms reductions over denuclearization.

Amid growing U.S.-China tensions, Seoul also faces challenges in managing its relationship with Beijing.

However, some experts in South Korea and the United States see potential opportunities in Trump’s transactional leadership style.

They recommend that Seoul emphasize the strategic importance of the South Korea-U.S. alliance in countering China and promote the mutual benefits of the partnership. By doing so, South Korea could ensure its interests remain central to Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy should Trump return to office.

Soldiers from the U.S. Special Operations Command Korea are being transported by a helicopter for an airborne operation during a Korea-U.S. joint exercise at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, on May 2. [YONHAP]

━ Pulling troops out of Korea

During his presidency, Trump saw South Korea as a “freeloader” on U.S. security and demanded Seoul increase its financial contributions.

His views remain unchanged, as evidenced by his recent statements.

On Oct. 4, South Korea and the United States finalized their 12th Special Measures Agreement (SMA), which sets Seoul’s defense cost-sharing for U.S. forces at 1.52 trillion won ($1.14 billion) by 2026, up 8.3 percent from 1.4 trillion won in 2025.

Analysts believe the early conclusion of this agreement was intended to avoid sudden demands for increased contributions if Trump is re-elected, as the president of the United States can overturn the SMA, while in South Korea, any changes require ratification by the National Assembly.

In an Oct. 16 interview, Trump criticized South Korea’s defense payments, saying, “We have 42,000 soldiers there. They don’t pay,” a likely reference to the 28,500 U.S. service members stationed in South Korea. In another interview the previous day, he claimed that if he were still in office, Seoul would pay $10 billion a year, about nine times more than Korea would pay in 2026.

However, experts suggest that Trump’s comments are more likely a part of his election strategy and may not reflect actual policy.

Reducing or withdrawing U.S. troops, particularly from strategic locations like Camp Humphreys — the largest U.S. overseas base and just 520 kilometers (323 miles) from the Chinese city of Dalian — is seen as highly unlikely due to the base’s importance in countering China.

“U.S. troops in South Korea are necessary for both countries,” said Prof. Choi Jong-kun at Yonsei University’s Political Science and International Department, who previously served as a first vice foreign minister. “With ongoing issues involving China and Russia, it’s hard to imagine where else the United States could relocate its forces.”

Members of a civic group shout slogans urging the cessation of "humiliating negotiations" over the 12th Special Measures Agreement between Korea and the United States near the Seoul Campus of the Korea National Defense University in Yongsan District, central Seoul, where the meeting is being held, on July 10. [NEWS1]

Experts suggest Seoul prepare for potential negotiations under a Trump administration.

“If Trump’s demands materialize, South Korea should show some goodwill but also use the opportunity to secure its own interests,” said Prof. Yoon Seong-won from Hanyang University’s Political Science and International Studies Department.

“We should identify areas where the United States finds less value and propose alternatives that benefit both sides, which fits Trump’s transactional approach,” said Yang Uk, a researcher at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, a Seoul-based think tank.

One such counteroffer, according to the military expert, could be South Korea contributing to the U.S. nuclear modernization program while demanding certain assets be positioned for quick deployment to the peninsula.

━ Nuclear deterrence vs. armament

The U.S. and South Korea have reaffirmed their commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but doubts persist about the reliability of U.S. extended deterrence — particularly under the shadow of a potential second Trump presidency.

“Trump’s position is to reduce or manage the North Korean threat,” said Kim Hyun-wook, president of the Sejong Institute, a Seoul-based think tank.

He warns that with a focus on threat management rather than elimination, Trump may pursue a freeze-for-sanctions deal, which could cause significant friction with Seoul.

“South Korea will be dissatisfied with the United States’ North Korea policy, and discord between South Korea and the United States is a possibility,” he added.

North Korea continues to escalate tensions, having unveiled a new uranium enrichment facility on Sept. 13. The regime justifies its nuclear development as a defensive response to the “U.S. nuclear threat.”

Experts are divided on whether North Korea may conduct a seventh nuclear test before the U.S. presidential elections.

“Many say that there is a possibility that Pyongyang will conduct a seventh nuclear test before the elections, but that is something I don’t entirely agree with,” said Yang. “From my analysis, I believe that if North Korea were going to conduct a seventh nuclear test, it would have already done so. They also know that anything they do now will not be as big an issue amid the war in Ukraine or the Israel-Hamas conflict.”

Seventy-one percent of 1,006 respondents believe that South Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons if North Korea refuses to abandon its nuclear arsenal, according to a poll jointly conducted by the JoongAng Ilbo, an affiliate of the Korea JoongAng Daily, and the East Asia Institute. [JOONGANG ILBO]

Public support for independent nuclear capabilities in South Korea has surged, with polls indicating 60 to 70 percent approval.

However, there are limitations to relying solely on declarative nuclear deterrence, according to experts.

"If the U.S. does not clearly state its extended deterrence policy, South Korea should leave open the possibility of independent nuclear armament," said Yoon. This reflects a growing consensus that the U.S.'s current deterrence posture may need to evolve toward a more action-oriented approach.

The poll also showed a growing distrust in U.S. extended deterrence, which rose from 26.2 percent last year to 47.4 percent this year, among 1,006 respondents, according to a poll jointly conducted by the JoongAng Ilbo, an affiliate of the Korea JoongAng Daily, and the East Asia Institute. [JOONGANG ILBO]

Evans Revere, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies, warns that a lack of clarity from Washington could encourage South Korea to explore options beyond the alliance framework.

“If a Trump administration were to fail to maintain this commitment, it would undermine the alliance and shake the confidence of [South Korea] and other U.S. allies in America’s word and its reliability,” he said.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, left, and then U.S. President Donald Trump chat in the House of Freedom on the South Korean side of the truce village of Panmunjom on June 30, 2019. [KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY]

━ Will Trump meet Kim Jong-un again?

The former U.S. president has frequently referenced his relationship with the North Korean leader during campaign speeches, reminiscing about their interactions during his first term. Trump met North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at their first summit in Singapore in June 2018 and at the 2019 Hanoi summit, which ultimately failed to produce lasting agreements. The two also shook hands briefly at Panmunjom in June 2019 and exchanged a series of letters.

“I got along very well with North Korea, Kim Jong-un … It’s nice to get along with someone that has a lot of nuclear weapons, isn’t it?” Trump said in a speech on July 18 this year. He hinted at the possibility of meeting Kim again if he wins the 2024 election, adding, “He’d like to see me back, too.”

Despite Trump’s apparent confidence in his rapport with Kim, many analysts argue North Korea would not be a top priority in a second Trump administration.

“America’s number one foreign policy priority will likely be China,” said Prof. Choi, emphasizing that domestic issues, along with China, Ukraine and the Middle East, would dominate Trump’s foreign policy agenda. “The Korean Peninsula will likely be a lower priority due to repeated failures over the past 30 years in resolving the North Korea issue.”

North Korea’s growing alignment with Russia and distancing from South Korea may also lead Kim to reconsider the value of another meeting with Trump.

“Expecting Trump to behave the same as he did in 2017-2020 is unrealistic,” Prof. Choi said. “North Korea has evolved. Kim may now ask, ‘Why do I need to meet Trump again?’”

Some critics argue that Trump’s approach to North Korea was overly simplistic.

“Trump treated North Korea like a business deal, without fully grasping the authoritarian nature of the regime,” Yang said. “He elevated Kim, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on the global stage, but didn’t achieve substantial outcomes.”

“I can’t envision a scenario where North Korea would genuinely reduce its nuclear arsenal or freeze its weapons program,” said Revere. “But I can easily imagine Pyongyang making false promises to extract concessions.”

There is growing concern that Trump, in a bid to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough, might offer sanctions relief in exchange for a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear program, or, in a worst-case scenario, recognize North Korea as a nuclear state.

Former South Korean President Moon Jae-in, center, former U.S. President Donald Trump, right, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un converse during their historic meeting at Panmunjom in June 2019. [YONHAP]

Yang warned that lowering the bar for negotiations could “lead to a ‘Korea passing’ situation,” where the United States and North Korea strike a deal without considering South Korea’s interests.

Although Trump’s potential return to office brings uncertainty, some experts optimistically note that closer U.S.-North Korea talks could reduce the risk of military provocations.

“If these talks lead to reductions in North Korea’s nuclear weapons, that would ultimately benefit us,” Prof. Choi said. “Moreover, during periods of improved relations, the North is less likely to conduct military provocations, which could contribute to greater peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, left, U.S. President Joe Biden, center, and former Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida walk together toward a joint press conference at Camp David, the U.S. presidential retreat near Washington, on Aug. 18, 2023. [YONHAP]

━ Multilateral cooperation under threat

On Aug. 18, 2023, President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida met at Camp David and technically adopted a set of three agreements laying the groundwork for trilateral cooperation. This agreement emphasizes joint military exercises, real-time missile warning sharing and countermeasures against North Korea's cyber activities.

The importance of these measures needs to be underscored in light of the potential change that a second Trump presidency could bring.

"These steps are vital for reinforcing regional deterrence, but their long-term success depends on political continuity in the United States," said Kim.

The Biden administration has leaned heavily on multilateral frameworks such as the Quad and Aukus to counter China's influence and secure global supply chains. Along with the United States, the Quad includes Australia, India and Japan, while Aukus involves Britain and Australia. However, to succeed, they require stability in U.S. leadership.

A second Trump administration could disrupt the stability of trilateral cooperation, as Trump may prioritize bilateral dealings over multilateral frameworks based on his transactional diplomacy. This raises concern that reducing U.S. troops in Korea or increasing pressure on defense cost-sharing could undermine existing agreements and create uncertainty among partners.

Trump "views alliances as purely transactional arrangements or 'deals,' not as sacred obligations or commitments," said Revere.

Then U.S. President Donald Trump, left, meets with China's President Xi Jinping at a bilateral meeting at the G20 leaders summit in Osaka, Japan, on June 29, 2019. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

Beyond defense, South Korea faces a dilemma between aligning with the United States and maintaining relations with China. Experts warn that Korea's military and economic power is insufficient for a true balancing strategy.

"At this point, South Korea's national strategy should focus on strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance," said Yoon. Yet, Korea cannot sever ties with China entirely, given its importance for peaceful resolutions on the Korean Peninsula. Yoon argues that while reducing dependency on China is crucial, South Korea should continue to leverage multilateral platforms for cooperation with China and Russia, without directly opposing U.S. interests.

BY SEO JI-EUN, LIM JEONG-WON [seo.jieun1@joongang.co.kr]