What would a Harris administration do on foreign policy?

It is not clear how much of a role they will actually receive, but some key mid-level positions might go their way in a Harris administration.

Michael Green

The author is CEO of the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Since Vice President Kamala Harris emerged as the standard-bearer for the Democratic Party in July, she has reinvigorated the campaign against Donald Trump and is slightly ahead in most swing states, where a month ago Democrats thought they might lose the White House, Senate and House. The country is still politically divided and under any scenario the race is likely to be close, but Democrats have a bounce in their step for the first time in many months.

So if Harris wins in November, what would her administration actually do? This question has fallen to the background somewhat with the rollercoaster of political news the past month, but it is actually the most important question of all. Harris has issued a somewhat populist economic manifesto but no clear foreign policy statement yet. Nevertheless, we can discern some of the contours of what a Harris policy on international affairs, Asia, and the Korean peninsula might be.

First, we know that there will be continuity from Biden in many areas. Harris sat in on President Biden’s Presidential Daily brief almost every day, which meant that she saw the picture of threats and opportunities in the world from the same perspective as Biden. She was also a regular participant in the National Security Council (NSC) meetings chaired by the president. Unlike Joe Biden who pushed for certain policy ideas in those meetings when he was Obama’s Vice President (often to the chagrin of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton or Secretary of Defense Bob Gates), Harris has reportedly had more of a prosecutor’s habit of asking hard questions and challenging assumptions. As a Senator, Joe Biden was Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee and gave more statements than questions, but Harris had a reputation for “cross-examining” witnesses like she was in court. That all suggests a leader who is more of a pragmatist than an ideologue or strategic visionary.

However, Harris’s advisors do say that she has a coherent worldview. They point to her keynote speech at the Munich Security Conference in February as the best example. That speech was largely about the NATO and Ukraine also elaborated on Biden’s argument that international affairs today are a clash between authoritarian states and democracies. This appears to be more than just echoing her boss. Her staff speaks of her deep interest in “principled global engagement.” When they describe the objectives of her foreign policy, they repeat the words “rules and norms” often, noting that as a former prosecutor and State attorney general she often sees geopolitics in those legal and normative terms. In that sense, she would probably find much common ground with President Yoon Suk Yeol, another former prosecutor.

On Asia, Harris and her advisors emphasize the centrality of U.S. alliances with Korea and others and the importance of continuing the Washington Declaration with Seoul and Camp David commitments trilaterally with Japan. She is also a realist about China and the inescapability of “strategic competition” with Beijing in key areas like the South China Sea, AI, and regional influence. Her top two national security advisors are Phil Gordon, whose main areas of expertise are Europe and the Middle East, and Rebecca Lisner, who is a broad expert on national security strategy. Harris has taken far more trips to Europe than Asia as Vice President — and her Asia trips focused on Southeast Asia — but that schedule is one dictated by the Oval Office and the NSC as much as her own staff. Presumably as President, she would continue to lead on core Asia Hands like Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell.

There are a few areas where Harris has demonstrated a keen personal interest in national security. These include AI and space (the latter often being the purvue of vice presidents), as well as gender which Harris would likely emphasize even more than Biden in foreign policy pronouncements. Climate is also a central theme for Harris which she and her advisors describe as “equally important to geopolitical competition with China and Russia.”

One other hint about how Harris might approach Asia comes with her Vice Presidential candidate, Governor Tim Walz of Minnesota. I hosted Walz and a Minnesota delegation in Sydney, Australia last year and found him incredibly engaging and interested in the region. He taught English in China for a year and while the Republicans are trying to tarnish him as pro-China, the reality is that he has been a strong critic of human rights abuses in China and an advocate of U.S. alliances in the region. He could emerge as a key player with allies like Korea going forward if the Democrats win the election.

These are all reassuring aspects of a potential Harris administration. But there are also questions looming about her approach to Asia and the world. On trade policy, Harris appears to be even less forward-leaning than Biden. Her staff uses the term “workers policy” instead of “trade policy” in meetings — a clear indication of the influence of the progressives’ hold on that issue. Her national security team makes even less of an effort to make the case for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) than Biden’s team does. It is possible that as a pragmatist focused on geopolitical competition with China, she would come around to a more activist economic policy in Asia, but the indications of such a potential shift are not there yet.

The other question is how much of a purchase the progressive left gains on her administration. Biden’s was always a coalition government of factions within the Democratic Party. The centrists owned national security and the progressive left owned trade for the most part. Now the progressive left is making a pitch to Harris to have a bigger role if she wins — arguing that much of the surge in her support is coming from younger progressive voters who are owed something in return should she win. Former staffers of Socialist Senator Bernie Sanders and think tank experts associated with the “restrainer” argument (that America should pull back from military commitments) have been preparing lists of officials Harris could hire. Many of these “experts” favor de-escalating of competition with China, a peace agreement with North Korea, and prioritization of climate change above geopolitical issues. These voices have been frustrated at their lack of influence with Biden and see an opportunity with Harris. It is not clear how much of a role they will actually receive, but some key mid-level positions might go their way in a Harris administration.