Korean Peninsula geopolitics becomes global

It is fair to say that the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula have rarely mattered as much in recent decades as they do today.

Ramon Pacheco PardoThe author is a professor of international relations at King’s College London and KF-VUB Korea Chair at Brussels School of Governance, Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

North Korea-Russia ties have reached new heights unseen since the end of the Cold War. South Korea and its ally, the United States, are understandably worried. China and Japan too, each of them for different reasons. But so is Europe. And the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia are watching closely.

The reason? What happens in the Korean Peninsula today has implications across the world. Korean Peninsula geopolitics have become global. This has deep implications for the South’s foreign policy and security posture.

For three decades, the confrontation between South and North Korea has essentially been circumscribed to the Korean Peninsula and a few other surrounding countries. During the Cold War, this confrontation had been part of a broader international battle between East and West. Following the end of the Cold War, this global element disappeared.

Today, however, the two Koreas can influence events well beyond the Korean Peninsula. In the particular case of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Seoul is providing support to Kyiv, including indirect arms transfers, and Pyongyang is supporting Moscow, including via direct arms transfers. This means that the geopolitics of the peninsula have global implications via Seoul’s and Pyongyang’s conscious choices and proactive decisions.

This explains why European leaders are alarmed following the summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership the two leaders have signed. To put it bluntly, European leaders understand that North Korean bullets and missiles are being — and will continue to be —used to kill Ukrainians. The North Korean threat isn’t hypothetical in the European continent. It is real for the Ukrainians defending their country against Russia’s invasion.

From this follows that Seoul’s response to the Kim-Putin summit and burgeoning North Korea-Russia ties will also have global implications. The South Korean government has already hinted that it will consider whether to supply lethal weapons directly to Ukraine in response. In material terms, this won’t make a significant difference since Seoul can always transfer weapons via third parties. From a political and diplomatic perspective, however, this would be a huge statement. It would please the United States, Europe and the many countries that explicitly or implicitly are against Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine. Russia, China or North Korea would, of course, be critical. But they would also clearly understand that South Korea is a central actor in conflicts far beyond the peninsula.

The global implications of Korean Peninsula geopolitics bring added responsibility to South Korean policy-makers, while also leading third countries to be more demanding of Seoul. In the past, South Korean actions in response to North Korea had limited impact beyond Northeast Asia. South Korean policy-makers could therefore focus on their country’s own national interest, with little regard for what third parties other than the United States and perhaps China thought. But this isn’t the case anymore. The sanctions on North Korea announced by the Yoon Suk Yeol government matter. The hint that South Korean weapons may be transferred to Ukraine directly matters. Both partners and foes will analyse South Korean actions closely.

The clear upside is that Seoul can garner stronger support from partners for its North Korea policy, since there is an element of reciprocity in Seoul’s relationship with them. In fact, European policy-makers are already discussing how to boost security, defence and intelligence ties with South Korea in response to the new partnership agreed by Pyongyang and Moscow. They will certainly ask Seoul to share more of the information that it has, to slap more sanctions on Pyongyang and to become even more vocal in its opposition to the North Korea-Russia partnership.

In return, Seoul can demand stronger support in the implementation of sanctions on Pyongyang. South Korea is also in a stronger position to request the technology and arms transfers that it needs. And if at some point Seoul and Pyongyang resume dialogue, South Korea will also be able to ask for greater support from Europe and the United States than it received when the two Koreas last sat down to talk.

It is fair to say that the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula have rarely mattered as much in recent decades as they do today. For South Korea, this brings the responsibility of behaving like a globally pivotal country, while also bringing the advantages of being a country that others want to cooperate closely with.