Start boosting our economic deterrence

We should have a close consultation with the United States to prepare effective ‘economic deterrence’ against a third party’s economic coercion.

Chang Se-jeongThe author is an editorial writer of the JoongAng Ilbo. Korea-Japan relations, frozen during the liberal Moon Jae-in administration, began to thaw after consevative President Yoon Suk Yeol defined Japan as a “cooperation partner” in his March 1 Independence Movement holiday speech last year and presented a compensation plan for the wartime forced labor. Despite the opposition’s persistent criticism of the president as a pro-Japanese leader, he flew to Tokyo and shook hands with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Remarkable changes took place in diplomatic and security fronts between the two countries after the two leaders’ summits in Tokyo and Seoul.

As the architect of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s diplomatic and security strategy, Kim Sung-han, currently a professor of international relations at the Graduate School of International Studies at Korea University, poses with a K9 self-propelled howitzer displayed at the War Memorial of Korea, close to the presidential office, earlier this month. [WOO SANG-JO]

The smooth sailing of their relations led to President Yoon’s glamorous state visit to the United States last April — epitomized by warm hospitality from U.S. President Joe Biden and fervent responses from guests to the Korean president’s singing of “American Pie” at the White House dinner. President Yoon went on to deliver a speech to a joint session of U.S. Congress, marking the 70th anniversary of the Korea-U.S. alliance, to an uninterrupted standing ovation. The three leaders held a tripartite summit at Camp David last August — the first of its kind — and made a joint statement promising to further strengthen the countries’ trilateral security cooperation.

As the first national security advisor to President Yoon, Kim Sung-han — currently a professor of international relations at Korea University’s Graduate School of International Studies — drew up a blueprint for the normalization of the trilateral diplomacy among Korea, the United States and Japan. Kim, an old friend of the president, served as head of the diplomacy and security committee of his transition team after Yoon’s election victory on March 9, 2022. Kim handled national security affairs at the presidential office from Yoon’s inauguration on May 10, 2022, until March 29, 2023. The following is his recollection of his thrilling year as the first national security advisor in the Yoon administration and his advice for Korea’ future diplomacy. The interview was conducted at War Memorial of Korea, close to the presidential office.

Q. Wasn’t there any opposition to the normalization of Korea’s relations with Japan? A. Both the presidential office and related ministries recognized the need to improve bilateral ties. On concrete solutions for forced labor compensation and the timing of announcing them, there were some disagreements between the National Security Office (NSO) and the Foreign Ministry. Senior officials had long and heated debates in my office. But thanks to the president’s strong will to improve the ties, we were able to push it speedily based on the consensus that we must move forward after putting our victimhood behind.

The Kishida cabinet’s approval rating recently fell sharply. Can these improved relations be maintained, regardless of Japan’s domestic politics? In a speech on this year’s March 1 Independence Movement holiday, President Yoon reaffirmed that Japan is Korea’s pivotal partner who share values with us, seek common interests and cooperates for world peace and prosperity. His emphasis on both countries’ “marching toward a new world” and his proposal for “enhancing the relations one step further” — on the occasion of the 60th year of the normalization of their diplomatic relations — suggest that there are many areas for the two to cooperate in a future-oriented way. If a new leader wants to return to the past, he or she will not get support from their people.

Will the results of the upcoming U.S. presidential election affect the alliance? Since the improvement of Korea-Japan ties, trilateral relations are sailing smoothly to offer a better environment for the risk management of the Korea-U.S. alliance. The U.S. government, whether Democratic or Republican, takes the position that the Korea-U.S. alliance and the U.S.-Japan alliance should work towards promoting trilateral security cooperation. It would be naïve to think that U.S. President Joe Biden’s victory over Donald Trump in a presumptive rematch in November will benefit Korea more than the reverse. What changes the direction of U.S. policy is not China or Japan, but American voters. It is time for Korea to rev up its public diplomacy to convince them of the necessity of its alliance.

How should we prepare for the so-called Trump risk? “U.S. election risks” could be a better phrase. We must brace for two risks. One involves how to deter against the North Korean nuclear threat and the other how to capitalize on the alliance to manage the China factor. We must double-check if the current extended deterrence is enough to curb the North’s nuclear missile threat. If Washington sits on its hands and demands that Seoul cooperate with its China policy, even when Beijing has launched economic retaliation against Korea — as the U.S. did over China’s methodical economic revenge against Korea’s deployment of the U.S.-led Thaad [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] antimissile system — we cannot accept it. Just as the United States wants to systematize and reinforce its nuclear deterrence against North Korea, we should have a close consultation with the country to prepare effective “economic deterrence” against a third party’s coercion. If Japan, Australia and New Zealand can join that economic deterrence, it could be even better.

While President Yoon was trying to put the estranged trilateral diplomacy back on track, North Korea, China and Russia joined forces to confront it. North Korea supplied massive military weapons to Russia for its war against Ukraine after the summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin last September. That significantly changed the developments of the war.

Some security experts say the new trilateral cooperation has worsened South Korea’s relations with China and Russia. Do you agree? We stress the importance of the tripartite cooperation because of North Korea, not China or Russia. In 2022, when the Yoon administration launched, North Korea refused dialogue, accelerated nuclear missile development and engaged in the largest number of strategic provocations since the Cold War. We had to forge solidarity with Japan on top of our ally and put tripartite cooperation into action. If some say our relations with China and Russia weakened as a result, that’s a distortion of the causal relationship. China and Russia have repeatedly refused to endorse the UN Security Council’s resolutions against the North’s provocations, even before the Camp David summit. In a nutshell, what spiked the strengthened trilateral ties was the North’s provocations and China’s and Russia’s siding with them, not vice versa.

How should we respond to the close connections between North Korea, China and Russia? We don’t have to distance ourselves from China and Russia simultaneously. Even though the trilateral security axis on the other side has evolved into a dangerous one, we must exploit their “strategic schisms” wisely instead of dealing with their security alliance at the same time. China and Russia can hardly separate themselves from North Korea, but China does not welcome close ties between North Korea and Russia either. We must have the flexibility to get close to China if Russia makes a mistake, and vice versa. In that case, our tripartite security cooperation will become more powerful.

The biggest headache for our security is North Korea. But the country drastically changed its strategy towards South Korea by defining inter-Korean relations as being “between two hostile states at war.” North Korea is expected to make a military provocation soon in waters near the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea after amending the territorial clauses of its Constitution.

How do you view the North Korean leader’s definition of inter-Korean relations as being those of two different states? It represents a determination to wage war against “a different country.” As Kim denied the nation, peace and unification his father and grandfather had upheld, his new definition of inter-Korean relations translates into a revocation of their cherished united front tactics. The bold negation primarily aims at the United States, as it implies that North Korea will be ready to cooperate with the Uncle Sam, except on denuclearization, if he treats North and South Korea as separate entities and respects the North’s sovereignty. For instance, as long as the U.S. recognizes a small number of its nuclear warheads, the North will abandon ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] allegedly capable of striking the U.S. mainland and possibly become a U.S. ally. If Kim believes such a strategy will work, he must be naïve. In this year’s March 1 Independence Movement holiday, President Yoon accentuated the “importance of freedom and unification” in response to Kim’s championing of two separate statehoods. Yoon’s remarks in the address — “Our genuine independence can be secured through reunification to ensure liberty and affluence for both residents of South and North Korea” — carry particular significance.

Will North Korea carry out a military provocation targeting the April 10 parliamentary elections in South Korea and the Nov. 5 presidential election in the U.S.? A full-scale provocation would not be an option for North Korea, as it must worry about the possibility of the Kim dynasty perishing in the face of massive retaliation from the alliance. But the possibility of a limited war in the five northernmost islands of the Yellow Sea or an extension of the war cannot be ruled out. While serving in the NSO, our team drew up more than 100 scenarios for the North’s provoking the South. We must update them to thoroughly prepare. As the likelihood of provocation persists even after the April 10 general elections, we must massively strengthen our spying and reconnaissance capabilities and innovate our military. Israel’s lax discipline invited provocation from Hamas. Our defense capability will only be completed by enhancing our reconnaissance. North Korea still refuses to talk, but the doors are always open.