What does Putin owe Kim Jong-un for Ukraine?

Korea must build a robust strategy with the United States, NATO, and other allies to impose costs on Russia should it cross redlines with respect to North Korean nuclear capabilities.

Michael GreenThe author is CEO of the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

The “Beyond Parallel” website run by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) produced a report on Feb. 28 that merits attention. According to the at CSIS, new satellite photos show that there continues to be heavy traffic of vessels between Najin in North Korea and ports in the Russian Far East. CSIS estimates that North Korea shipped 2.5 million rounds of artillery shells and other ammunition for Russian forces to use in the war against Ukraine.

This is disastrous news for Ukrainians and should be alarming to Koreans. Ukrainians can already feel the results on the front line where their offensive has faltered and Russia has slowly begun pushing further into Ukrainian-held territory. Ukraine is relying on U.S. and NATO production lines that are straining to keep-up with the huge volume of shells being fired (helped at a critical moment by Korea). It feels like a stalemate in Ukraine right now, but the fight may actually be in the balance and artillery is proving a key factor. Defeat for President Zelensky of Ukraine would be tragic for the people of Ukraine and put at risk NATO allies in the Baltic states where Russia also wishes to reassert hegemonic control. The United States would be forced to delay the pivot to Asia to maintain deterrence in Europe. This would be bad for Europe and for Korea and other U.S. allies facing challenges in Asia. Zelensky and the Ukrainian people are tough and motivated, but Kim Jong-un putting his fingers on the scale to help Putin.

Kim Jong-un’s rescue of Putin also has troubling implications for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Looking at the large volume of artillery going from the North to Russian forces, one has to ask, “what will Kim ask for in return?” It is safe to bet that his price will be more than food or fuel.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un shake hands during their meeting at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Russia’s Far East on Sept. 13, 2023. [AP]

One price Pyongyang will demand is already becoming clear. Even before the ammunition transfers to Russia, Moscow was making its veto available to Pyongyang to block UN Security Council action against the North for repeated satellite launches. Did Putin promise unlimited access to the Russian veto to Kim Jong-un in return for the artillery rounds that saved his forces? I suspect there was no blank check since Moscow does have an abiding interest in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons states on its borders, but Putin may have given permission for further satellite tests if not nuclear tests.

The second thing Putin might have promised Kim is technical assistance with the North Korean submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) program. Russia still has the second most advanced submarine fleet in the world after the United States. North Korea’s advances in submarine launched missiles surprised analysts. Russian technical assistance could explain why. It is quite possible that we will see further advances if not deployment of these submarines in the coming year.

The third trade might have been for Russian technical assistance with the North’s satellite launches. The North has mastered the launching of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). That may also have come with Russian assistance. The most significant remaining hurdle for the North is to configure a warhead that can withstand re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere without being destroyed. Russian assistance for such a re-entry vehicle would be both unprecedented in Russian history and profoundly dangerous and irresponsible. Yet Putin is now regularly threatening nuclear war against NATO so I would not automatically assume he is abiding by earlier nuclear weapons norms.

The fourth gift Putin can give to Kim Jong-un is to maintain or even increase the Russian Air Force and Navy operations in the Far East. We are already seeing unprecedented joint exercises between China and Russia and U.S. and Japanese fighters are scrambling to intercept Russian bombers at a tempo reminiscent of the Cold War. Stressing U.S. and allied forces to weaken deterrence everywhere is part of Russia’s playbook and something Kim would want.

While all four of these transactions are plausible, it is also important to remember that Russia does not want to risk putting its own security in the decision-making of Kim Jong-un. Nor is Beijing an uninterested party in this Russia-North Korea business partnership. Xi Jinping clearly does not want Russia to lose in Ukraine, but Beijing would be wary of Russian moves that make North Korea more unpredictable or spur cooperation among U.S. allies in Asia or between them and NATO.

And that points to one of Korea’s best cards. Korean support for Ukraine has helped Zelenksy hold fast against Russia’s expanding arsenal and demonstrated to Pyongyang, Beijing, and Moscow that democratic allies on opposite sides of the world will stand by each other when attacked by authoritarian states. The odd reality is that Ukranian and Russian forces are firing artillery rounds at each other that were originally manufactured for two opposing sides to fire at each other across the DMZ. But that strange fact is also a reminder that alliances are implicitly global and that helps to reinforce deterrence since the U.S. network of alliances would be much stronger if fully unified.

Another card Korea can play is to build on the defense industrial collaboration already underway between Korean firms and NATO member states. There are other opportunities for Korea to expand its defense industry cooperation with Australia or India. Where North Korea is becoming the “arsenal for authoritarianism,” South Korea can become the core of a new “arsenal for democracy.”

A third card Korea will need to play is anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Since the Cheonan sinking the ROK Navy has been improving its ASW capabilities. The possibility of Russian enhancement of North Korean SLBMs means that this effort must be redoubled, including greater trilateral cooperation with the U.S. Navy and Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces.

Finally, Korea must build a robust strategy with the United States, NATO, and other allies to impose costs on Russia should it cross redlines with respect to North Korean nuclear capabilities. “Kachi Kapshida” means all allies must now be ready to move together.