Diplomats and spies are different

The top priority is to restore human intelligence to North Korea and fill up the security vacuum following the suspension of its activities regarding domestic intelligence-gathering and the transfer of anti-communism investigations to the police.

Chae Sung-joonThe author is a professor of military science at Seokyeong University and a former researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy.

“America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests,” said Henry Kissinger, the diplomat who facilitated U.S.-China relations and the detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. “There is no such thing as a friendly intelligence agency. There are only intelligence agencies of friendly powers,” Kissinger said.

“The Spy and the Traitor,” published in the UK and now a bestseller, is about Oleg Gordievsky, a double agent of KGB and MI6, who is considered to have played a major role in hastening the end of the Cold War. A diplomat and a spy share the ultimate goal of protecting national security and national interests, but their ways of working are completely different.

In the ancient city states of Greece, “proxenos” meant “a friend of guests.” On the surface, they were in charge of taking care of visitors from the city of their origin, but they actually served as spies to deliver the situation to their home city state. The origin of a resident diplomat can be found in early modern Italian city states. One of their main roles was to secretly research trends in the host country and report them to their home nation, in addition to their standard diplomatic activities.

Diplomacy and spying began to diverge when secret intelligence agencies were established in modern European countries. Examples include Queen Elizabeth I’s Secret Service and French King Louis XIII’s “Chambre noir.” After the formation of modern states in the 19th century and through World War I, World War II and the Cold War, intelligence organizations began to take shape at the national level.

Embassies in other countries now have “white” intelligence agents, who are actually sent by spy agencies, though they are classified as diplomats. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union searched for spies among diplomats from enemy states. But between countries with normal diplomatic relations, “white” agents were sent for cooperation, and that tradition continues to this day.

The National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Korean equivalent of the CIA, will welcome new director Cho Tae-yong, formerly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs like his predecessor, Kim Kyou-hyun. Since becoming a diplomat through the foreign service examination in 1980, he has gained experience in diplomacy and security and has been recognized for his ability, serving as the first vice foreign minister, ambassador to the United States and national security advisor. There is no need to doubt his expertise.

But it is important to recognize the clear difference between the roles of diplomats and spies in cold international relations. The Foreign Ministry performs its duties legally and openly, while the intelligence agency’s work is not glamorous. A diplomat is accustomed to diplomatic rhetoric while an intelligence agent is armed with a spying mindset. This difference may be the reason why the predecessor had a hard time controlling the organization.

President Yoon Suk Yeol should have a special reason to appoint Cho. Until now, the NIS’s scope of work has been reduced — and the spy agency suffered from personnel management troubles. Stabilizing the organization is most urgent, but since Cho has earned strong confidence from Yoon, he will get positive marks for safeguarding the organization from external influence. Nevertheless, it is necessary to emphasize once again that an intelligence agent is not an ordinary civil servant but someone who “works in the dark and aims for the bright future.”

What is more important is to redefine its status and role as the nation’s information agency. The top priority is to restore human intelligence to North Korea and fill up the security vacuum following the suspension of its activities regarding domestic intelligence-gathering and the transfer of anti-communism investigations to the police. The NIS must learn from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)’s mistake of underestimating Ukraine and the Mossad’s failure to predict Hamas’ surprise attacks.

North Korea began the new year with a blatant provocation. In addition to security threats such as terrorism and industrial espionage, the NIS bears the burden of responding to the new Cold War, or the hegemony contest between the United States and China. At this point, the new director who pledges to “make the NIS the top intelligence agency’” has grave responsibility. The people and the politicians must join forces.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.