Fix the porous national mobilization system

The government must establish a reliable, efficient and integral system for the nonmilitary sector to function even during wartime, before it is too late.

Choi Gye-myung

The author, former head of the Emergency Preparedness Policy Bureau at the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, is an adjunct professor at Dongguk University.

One month has passed since Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel on Oct. 7. At dawn on Shabbat, the Jewish day of rest, and shortly after the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the Palestinian militant group launched an attack by firing thousands of rockets on Israel, killing 1,400 Israelis, mostly civilians, and taking hostage of more than 220 people.

The Israeli government immediately enforced a national mobilization order and mobilized 300,000 reserved forces, together with military equipment and supplies within 48 hours. Based on the solid mobilization system, Israel blockaded the Gaza Strip — Hamas’ foothold — and launched a military operation to occupy the narrow region between Israel and Egypt.

The surprise attack by Hamas is quite similar to North Korea’s attack tactics on South Korea. If North Korea stages a military provocation, South Korea will most likely suffer a lot in the initial stages. The problem is whether South Korea can swiftly activate its national mobilization system just like Israel, and launch an immediate retaliation and destroy the enemy.

Having many soldiers and advanced weapons does not always ensure a victory in a war. It depends on a nation’s ability to integrate all required capabilities — such as evacuating and protecting its people from enemy attacks, defending industrial facilities from attacks, encouraging the people to fight the enemy, and ensuring military supplies in the rear areas.

Victory in war is determined not only by military strength but also a broad combination of national power. The Israel-Hamas war will be no exception. Israel has been operating exclusive national systems like the Home Front Command (HFC) aimed at protecting civilians during peacetime and the National Emergency Economy Board (MELACH) to stabilize people’s livelihoods and support military operations during wartime.

Israel could launch counterattacks and minimize civilian damages, as it was able to mobilize all available reserve forces within 48 hours. But Hamas recklessly launched the surprise attack without such emergency systems in place. As a result, its civilians are being victimized by the Israeli counterattacks.

If North Korea attacks South Korea like Hamas did, South Korea may be able to manage a response in the early stages. But the problem comes next. Given apparent problems with mobilizing reserve forces, dealing with abrupt power and water outages, and a critical lack of daily necessities, chaos will be inevitable.

That’s why nonmilitary preparedness is as important as military preparedness for the government in times of emergency. Like Israel, our government should establish an effective system to assist military operations by mobilizing reserve soldiers and logistics, maintaining administrative functions and mainstay industries, and supplying daily necessities and relief goods if a war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula.

In the past, the government operated the National Emergency Planning Commission, a ministerial-level body, to carry out such missions. But after the Lee Myung-bak administration dismantled it in a revamp of government organizations in 2008, a bureau of the Ministry of the Interior and Safety plays the role now. The radical downsizing of the commission sounds alarms, as no substantial progress has been made in the nonmilitary sector to prepare for a war. I would make two proposals to the government in the wake of the war in the Middle East.

First, the government must thoroughly review all aspects of our national mobilization system. National mobilization is required for a state to change its peacetime system to a wartime system, and involves an efficient control of massive resources such as manpower, logistics, industry, transportation and facilities, not to mention the 311 essential items, including vaccines, to be deployed to the battlegrounds. Former President Park Chung Hee set up a committee to study national mobilization systems for the first time after the infiltration of North Korean commandos to attack the Blue House in 1968. The result of the committee research was the Chungmu Plan aimed at effectively mobilizing national resources in times of crisis. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration also must start to overhaul our nonmilitary preparedness by installing a similar committee even temporarily.

Second, the government must eventually restore such a standing emergency committee to prepare for a war in this land. It could be better if the government decides to place the organization under the president or the prime minister so that it can serve as a command center to control, and coordinate with, various ministries and local governments.

You must not shut the stable door after the horse has bolted. The government must establish a reliable, efficient and integral system for the nonmilitary sector to function even during wartime, before it is too late.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.