A shaky tripartite coalition

So, the coalition is not likely to develop into a multilateral alliance, aside from offering the room for solidarity among the three countries to jointly respond to U.S. sanctions and pressures.

Shin Bong-supThe author is a visiting professor at Kwangwoon University and former consul-general of the Korean Consulate in Shenyang, China.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping had an exclusive meeting on the sidelines of the third Belt and Road Summit in Beijing. But it was not announced if Xi had accepted the recent agreement reached between Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at their summit held at the Vostochny Cosmodrome spaceport.

After attending the Putin-Xi summit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov flew directly to Pyongyang for a lengthy meeting with the North Korean leader, fueling questions. As more than 1,000 containers of military equipment and artillery shells were apparently transported to Russia through the North Korean port of Rajin, it raises concerns that Russia may have discussed providing advanced military technology to North Korea in return.

As we can see from the North-Russia summit at the spaceport, the closer ties between the two countries symbolizes a significant shift in the security landscape of Northeast Asia. North Korea is seeking to leverage its military cooperation with Russia to lure China into a North-China-Russia trilateral coalition. But the question is whether China will join in.

China has kept distance from the approaches of North Korea and Russia. Beijing does not want to be associated with the neo-Cold War framework involving North Korea and Russia. Instead, China wants to improve its relations with the United States — and manage its relations with North Korea and Russia at the same time — while securing a strategic spot between America and Russia. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out that it is necessary to correct the interpretation that the China-Russia cooperation is a stepping stone for strengthening the coalition among the three countries.

The fate of the trilateral cooperation between Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow depends on China’s strategic judgment. But such a coalition is not a simple matter because each country’s interests and strategic visions are different. Rather than being complementary, they conflict with one another. So, the coalition is not likely to develop into a multilateral alliance, aside from offering the room for solidarity among the three countries to jointly respond to U.S. sanctions and pressures.

Historically, China-Russia relations have been characterized by mutual distrust and confrontations to the extent that the Soviet Union prepared for a nuclear attack on China amid their border clashes and ideological conflicts. The current China-Russia relationship is driven only by the common goal of building a multipolar order against the U.S.-centered unipolar system. Joint military exercises between China and Russia do not necessarily imply an alliance. China refused to provide military support to Russia for the Ukraine war, and Xi opposed Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine during his visit to Moscow in March.

The North Korea-China relationship is also not as smooth as it may seem. While China wants to preserve the North Korean regime as a “strategic asset,” it does not want the North Korean nuclear programs to become an obstacle to Northeast Asian security and China’s economic growth. It is a two-track approach. North Korea also seeks economic survival through a “balance of dependence” while being wary of China’s engagement and influence. That’s why there is a deep-seated mistrust between the two neighbors. China’s assistance to the North has also fallen short of Pyongyang’s expectations.

While investing $50 billion to $60 billion annually in the countries participating in its Belt and Road initiative, China has applied strict standards on its investment and infrastructure support for the North. North Korea is not a part of the Belt and Road Initiative. There were no North Korean representatives at the recent Belt and Road Summit. China sent envoys to Pyongyang to attend the 70th anniversary of the armistice and the 75th anniversary of the founding of the North Korean regime, but they were not welcomed heartily. South Korea sent its prime minister to the opening ceremony of the Hangzhou Asian Games, but North Korea didn’t send a high-level delegation.

China seems to be uncomfortable about the strategic honeymoon between North Korea and Russia. As Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said the North-Russia joint military drills are “of course” being discussed, it will take place soon. But a trilateral exercise among the North, China and Russia is a different story. Unless there is a breakdown in U.S.-China relations, China would not participate in such a drill, because it does not serve China’s strategic interests.

South Korea needs to take a proactive approach to cooperate and communicate with stakeholders so that its cooperation with the U.S. and Japan does not turn into a mechanism confronting North Korea, China and Russia. First, Seoul needs to communicate with Beijing to separate China from the Pyongyang-Moscow military cooperation. Second, South Korea must work with the international community to strongly warn North Korea and Russia not to cross a red line through sanctions and pressures. Third, Seoul must use all possible diplomatic capabilities to resume the South-China-Japan summit, which has been suspended since 2019, and arrange Xi’s visit to South Korea. Maximizing national interests by exercising strategic flexibility in a changing security environment is not an option in diplomacy, but a requirement.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.