Lessons from Hamas’s attack on Israel

he recent Hamas attack on Israel reminds us of the gravity of the North’s threats and the South’s security situation.

Bang Jong-goanThe author, a retired Army major general, is the director of the Military Capabilities Development Center at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy.

War is an act of violence to impose one’s will on an enemy. As national existence and people’s lives are at stake, the violence is forced to become more extreme. Hamas’s attacks on Israel are no different. A classic example is the Palestinian militant group firing thousands of rockets in a 20-minute period at dawn on Shabbat, followed by infiltration by motorized paragliders to indiscriminately kill civilians participating in festivals and holding a large number of hostages with threats to kill them.

The behavior of the Hamas could be a preview of an invasion by North Korea whose military capabilities are incomparable to that of the Hamas. Since the days of Kim Il Sung, the North has focused on bizarre and sly tactics. That means the recalcitrant state will not limit itself in terms of the means and methods of attacks. A war on the Korean Peninsula is terrifying to even to imagine.

North Korea will certainly try a surprise attack by taking advantage of South Korea’s intelligence failure. The North may offer the long-awaited denuclearization or humanitarian talks just before starting a war. Just like Hamas, it may deceive South Korea by feigning its interest in economic gains above all. The impact of a blitzkrieg will be maximized if the North launches an invasion on a holiday when most South Koreans are traveling — as in the case of the Shabbat dawn attack.

The attack will start with asymmetric weapons. The North can fire up to 16,000 rounds per hour with its 340 long-range rocket launchers targeting Seoul and the Gyeonggi province. About 200,000 special operations troops could infiltrate the South’s rear areas using AN-2 aircraft for low altitude penetration and landing craft air cushions (LCACs). Helicopters similar to South Korea’s 500MDs and powered paragliders, also used by civilian enthusiasts in the South, will make it even more difficult to identify the enemy.

The North Korean military has 1.28 million soldiers. Vladimir Lenin famously said, “Sometimes quantity has a quality all its own.” If the North massively mobilizes its troops at a great cost in the early stages of the war, it could capture some areas near the border. And then it could demand a negotiation by taking hostage of the people in its occupied areas and threatening to use nuclear weapons. This scenario is not merely an imagined one, as it is recognized as a possibility by intelligence agencies and military experts.

What is our plan? First of all, we must not lose the intelligence war. Advanced intelligence assets such as reconnaissance satellites are necessary. But overreliance on technology is dangerous as we can be deceived by even primitive weapons. The “no-fly zone” under the two Koreas’ Sept. 19 military agreement also made it impossible to collect intelligence on the border. The consensus was based on the premise that the North has good intentions, but its intentions can change at any time. Therefore, intelligence should be judged based on the enemy’s capabilities.

The North’s long-range rocket attacks can be blocked by our tactical surface-to-surface guided missiles, Chunmoo multiple rocket launchers, and K-9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers. The massive rocket attacks recently carried out by Hamas on Israel raised doubts about the interceptor system our military is developing to defend against incoming long-range rockets from the North.

However, it is important to remember that the interceptor system’s primary purpose is to protect critical facilities and key military bases in the South. Defending the entire area of this country exceeds military rationality in terms of budget and technology. In defense, perfection is just a myth. That’s why our countermeasures such as building civilian evacuation facilities, early warning systems, and civil defense drills are urgently needed.

Against the North’s special operations forces, the South can launch precision strikes on their bases, while annihilating still infiltrating troops by joint operations at sea and in the air. Regular drills are also necessary. But the number of such exercises has decreased since the Sept. 19, 2018 military agreement in Pyongyang. If the exercises remain the same without any improvements, the effectiveness will decrease critically. We must train our soldiers as if in a real battle under the scenario of the worst possibilities — and based on operating our own capable forces to deal with the special forces from North Korea.

If the North manages to occupy some areas and resorts to nuclear threats, an internal division will reach its peak in the South. We need a serious discussion on dealing with such a situation, regardless of political interests. Through the Nuclear Consultative Group between Seoul and Washington, which was agreed to by the two countries’ presidents at the Washington summit in April 2023, both allies must find effective ways to cope with such a gruesome scenario in advance.

A foolish man realizes his weakness only after experiencing a failure, but a wise man learns from the mistakes of others. The recent Hamas attack on Israel reminds us of the gravity of the North’s threats and the South’s security situation. The time has come to seriously review and improve our readiness before it’s too late.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.