Allow Korea to develop nuclear-powered subs

The shackles on South Korea in developing its nuclear capabilities must be lifted so that the country can develop nuclear-powered subs with cooperation from the U.S.

Song Seung-jongThe author is a professor of military studies at Daejon University and head of the Center for Security Strategy at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy. The possibility of a “dangerous deal” between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the spaceport in Vostochny last month calls for a sober examination of the blind spots in South Korea’s security approach. The agreement from the trilateral talks among South Korean, U.S. and Japanese leaders in Camp David in August should be put into action fast.

In the Washington Declaration announced during President Yoon Suk Yeol’s state visit to the United States in April to mark the 70th anniversary of the alliance, the two allies agreed to strengthen the extended deterrence, elevate it to the level of mutual defense, and deploy U.S. tactical weapons on a constant basis. But the evaluation on the specifics of the agreement remain mixed.

The West’s intelligence reports projecting geopolitics from 2040 to 2050 are generally skeptical of North Korea taking the path of denuclearization by then. The Global Trends 2040 report by the U.S. National Intelligence Council floats the possibility of South Korea and Japan going toward nuclear armament to deal with the North Korean threat. The Global Strategic Trends 2050 issued by the UK sees the danger of the Kim Jong-un regime risking a nuclear attack if it feels threatened. Australia’s Future Operating Environment 2035 projects North Korea to resort to nuclear brinkmanship to gain recognition as a nuclear weapons state and international concessions.

Pyongyang recently claimed that it has built its first tactical nuclear attack submarine. Building a nuclear submarine is one of its five major weapons program together with hypersonic missiles and solid fuel-propelled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

After the summit with Putin, Kim hurriedly went to a submarine building site in the Russian Far East. Some speculate that Russia could provide North Korea with the technologies needed to build a nuclear-powered submarine or a missile engine if not miniaturized nuclear warheads. If that happens, the balance of power around the Korean Peninsula could change dramatically.

The Australia-UK-U.S. (Aukus) security partnership allowed Australia to build nuclear-powered submarines. Under the agreement, Australia decided to build up to eight nuclear subs with British design and U.S. technology. The Aukus is based on the initiative to support Canberra’s nuclear-propelled submarine program and enhance joint capabilities and interoperability on cyber capabilities, AI, quantum computing, and additional undersea capabilities. Aukus extends the Australian model beyond nuclear submarine, as it implies role-sharing among allies.

Role-sharing transcends burden-sharing. The latter focuses on “fairness” as in the case of the U.S. demanding extra defense cost-sharing from its allies corresponding to their national power. But the former is based on comparative advantage. If an ally has strengths in a certain area, it is requited to take a bigger role and responsibility for the field. Role-sharing goes beyond fairness, as it aims to raise efficiency and effectiveness, as well as synergy effect. In this case, the allies can strengthen deterrence and joint response capabilities against a common security threat through a well-choreographed employment of restricted resources.

But the South Korea-U.S. nuclear agreement stands as a stumbling block in applying the Australian model to South Korea. Under the bilateral agreement, South Korea is even barred from using low-grade uranium of less than 20 percent concentration, let alone highly-enriched uranium, to propel a nuclear submarine. Seoul and Washington must address this sticking point if they wish to divide their roles.

The concept of the blanket nuclear umbrella to fully protect the Korean Peninsula is no longer realistic. Washington instead must invite Seoul and Tokyo to join the Aukus. The United States knows that the hub-and-spoke approach has been outlived. As a result, the United States has been accelerating efforts to establish small-sized and multilateral consultative bodies among like-minded allies through the Aukus, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, I2U2 (India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States), for instance. It will be better if the Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation can be upgraded to the level of Aukus. Uncle Sam cannot play a solo leader any longer.

The two Koreas are heatedly vying to secure nuclear-propelled submarines. The shackles on South Korea in developing its nuclear capabilities must be lifted so that the country can develop nuclear-powered subs with cooperation from the U.S. British biologist Charles Darwin once said, “It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intellectual that survives. It is the one that is most adaptable to change.” Just like that, South Korea must quickly shift to the new paradigm to adapt to the rapidly changing security environment.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.