Tackling challenges from Camp David

The first exclusive tripartite summit at Camp David on Aug. 18 was a dramatic turning point in the seven decades of the Korea-U.S. alliance. But Korea is faced with many challenges.

Wie Sung-rak

The author is a former South Korean representative to the six-party talks and head of the diplomacy and security division of the JoongAng Ilbo’s Reset Korea campaign.

The first exclusive tripartite summit at Camp David on Aug. 18 was a dramatic turning point in the seven decades of the Korea-U.S. alliance. The three leaders of South Korea, the United States and Japan hammered out a commitment to consult with one another and jointly respond to a contingency defined as a “regional threat” affecting their common interests. The commitment is similar to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which requires a consultation among members at times of emergency. Article 5 of the treaty even mandates a joint response to an external attack by regarding an attack on a member as an attack on all members. Consultation and coordination for cooperation are considered the first step to reinforced security cooperation.

The trilateral security cooperation system was long sought by the United States to deal with a rising China. Korean governments, conservative or liberal, were cautious about the cooperation system citing China risks, but the Yoon Suk Yeol administration took a drastic turn given its new values, the deepening threats from North Korea, the heated U.S.-China conflict and the Ukraine war. A U.S. official said the days of the alliance can be divided into the pre-summit and post-summit periods. Thanks to the merger of the Korea-U.S. alliance and the U.S.-Japan alliance, the United States can further tighten its control from now.

On its part, Korea can strengthen deterrence. Above all, the tripartite summit offered the country some shelters to deal with high-handed China and high-nosed Russia. Korea suffered China’s retaliation alone after the Thaad deployment, but probably not anymore. The security commitment from the summit also means Korea’s departure from its ambiguous stance toward the two superpowers — and from its excessive prudence on China. Such inertia does not fit Korea’s stature any longer. The trilateral cooperation is also expected to bring benefits to economic and technological fields.

But Korea is faced with many challenges. First, it must bear the burden from its entanglement in international conflicts. Korea now must consult with the United States and Japan over mounting Sino-U.S. friction, including simmering disputes over the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea, as well as supply chains. The same applies to the Japan-China conflict over the Senkaku Island (Diaoyudao in Chinese) and the Japan-Russia discord over the waters off the Kuril Islands. From now on, the U.S. will orchestrate tripartite consultations of different levels. The United States has already started to broaden the scope of cooperation. The commitment demands their consultation on “regional threats that affect their common interest.” But the United States said they are supposed to consult each other when one of them are threatened — a step closer to NATO. To be sure, it will not be easy for Korea to deny the commonality of interests.

Second, the summit will trigger a backlash from North Korea, China and Russia. As the three countries have persistently opposed the tripartite security cooperation, they will likely pressure the weak link, South Korea. The summit will most likely prompt friction in Korea’s relations with China, Russia and North Korea. The trilateral cooperation could pose a security dilemma to us by provoking a joint reaction from North Korea, China and Russia.

Third, converging public opinion is key. Koreans are not familiar with the tripartite security cooperation. In particular, their support for security cooperation with Japan is low. If North Korea, China and Russia form a joint front against South Korea, the deep-rooted conflict between the progressives and the conservatives will deepen further.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, center, inspects a military parade in Pyongyang with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, left, and Li Hongzhong, right, a Chinese Communist Party Politburo member, on July 27 to celebrate North Korea’s “Victory Day,” when the Korean War Armistice was signed 70 years ago in 1953. [YONHAP]

After the summit, we will be living in an era when the South Korea-U.S.-Japan axis and the North Korea-China-Russia axis are clashing before us. How should we position ourselves? South Korea is a country mired in a unique geopolitical contest. It is directly exposed to the North Korean nuclear threat and surrounded by four major powers, but at the same time it faces the challenges of denuclearizing North Korea, building a permanent peace regime, and unifying the divided land. To achieve the goals under such volatile circumstances, we must secure diplomatic space for North Korea, China and Russia, even while cooperating with the United States and Japan. If conflict deepens between the two axes of power, we can hardly address the three challenges.

To secure diplomatic room for North Korea, China and Russia, we must first have a well-coordinated strategy to deal with the United States, China and Russia. As our U.S. policy cannot be incompatible with our China policy under the current power dynamics, the two cannot be separated. Therefore, we must clearly define the scope of the trilateral cooperation and the limits of diplomatic space for China and Russia.

With that strategy in mind, we must discuss with the United States any possible negative impact of our entanglement in international discords on the denuclearization and peace on the peninsula. We also should convince China and Russia of the need for their cooperation on establishing peace on the peninsula. We must engage in skillful diplomacy with China and Russia to persuade them to consider the denuclearization as an issue of their common interest despite their ongoing confrontation with the United States.

In the meantime, the Yoon administration must accelerate communication with the public to reach a consensus on the security issue. In fact, Korea should have launched a social debate on its stance between the United States and China. But the past governments shunned it. As a result, Koreans are not only unfamiliar with the issue but also are sharply divided between the conservatives and the liberals. The Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation has been augmented under such circumstances. The government must communicate with the public and opposition parties to find our best possible strategy toward the United States, China and Russia before it’s too late.

The Camp David summit was a watershed moment for our diplomacy, but it also put our diplomacy on the test bed. The government must present effective diplomatic solutions to deal with North Korea, China and Russia and broaden public consensus by canvassing public opinions.