The big play at Camp David

But could this breakthrough eventually collapse as so many have in the past? There are some weaknesses to watch.

Michael GreenThe author is CEO of the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The Camp David trilateral summit hosted by President Joe Biden for President Yoon Suk-yeol and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio was the Biden administration’s most important power play in Asia since the announcement of the U.S.-U.K.-Australia “Aukus” pact to build nuclear powered submarines and cooperate on advanced military technologies. From a historical perspective, it is arguably much bigger than Aukus because nobody doubted that the United States, United Kingdom and Australia could work together. There was doubt, however, about whether Japan and Korea could align strategically. In fact, years of professed “strategic ambiguity” by Seoul and gratuitous friction between Japanese and Korean governments risked convincing Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang that the two major U.S. allies in Northeast Asia could be played against each other to break up the U.S. alliance system and shift strategic influence away from Washington. This is hardly new. The Korean peninsula has long been the “cockpit of Asia” where the great powers competed for influence and were often drawn into wars that trampled the Korean people — from the Imjin Wars to the Sino-Japanese War and the Korean War. The Camp David trilateral summit showed that Korea is not in play — that Seoul is aligned with the interests and values of the democratic countries and a future for Asia that is free and prosperous, even as Korea pursues economic prosperity with China. As U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stressed, the United States is not pursuing a “NATO” in Asia, but the pledge by the three leaders at Camp David to consult immediately if any one of the three is attacked has the flavor of collective security in waiting.

Will it last? There have been comparable breakthroughs in Japan-Korea relations in the past, sometimes aided by the United States and sometimes quietly cheered on in Washington. The 1965 normalization of Japan-Korea relations was assisted behind the scenes by U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer and benefited Korea economically and Japan strategically. The alignment between Nakasone Yasuhiro and Chun Doo Hwan in the 1980s was part of a larger reconciliation between the Reagan administration and Korea after the contentious Jimmy Carter years, but also benefited from Reagan’s close friendship with Nakasone (the so-called “Ron-Yasu” relationship). In 1998 the Kim Dae-jung summit in Tokyo with Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo led to a joint statement in which the Japanese leader offered “deep remorse and heartfelt apology” (owabi to hansei) and a pledge from Kim that Korea welcomed a larger role for Japan going forward, fueled by the opening of cultural trade and a boom for Korean soft power in Japan.

Each of these dramatic breakthroughs required political leadership and courage. Park Chung Hee had to stare down attacks on Japan at home with memories of occupation and de-culturalization still very present in the minds of most Koreans. In 1998 Obuchi shut down critics within Japan’s LDP, and when one of them — agriculture minister Nakagawa Shoichi — attacked Korea for not thanking Japan for building the economy before 1945, Kim Dae-jung wisely chose not to respond. This time President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida also displayed courage. Both leaders have public support rates in the 30 percent range, and President Yoon in particular faced withering criticism from the left for his decision to resolve historical court cases by paying victims directly. The courage of Yoon and Kishida is even greater because Japanese politicians on the left (Kishida is a centrist and thus on the left of the LDP) and Korean politicians on the right (like Yoon) face a much harder task since the critics of the other country tend to not be under their own political faction or party. It was that same logic that meant only Nixon could go to China. Put another way — it would have been easier for Abe to do this than it was for Kishida and much easier for Moon Jae-in to do it than it was for Yoon.

The U.S. role was also important. Donald Trump made the Korea-Japan friction worse by complaining in public that he did not have time or interest to repair relations between other countries. Some senior officials in the Pentagon tried, but the President himself visibly abdicated his role as leader of these alliances, and that undercut the efforts of those in Seoul and Tokyo trying to make progress. Biden in contrast, made trilateral cooperation with Japan and Korea a top priority in his foreign policy agenda, recognizing that not only bilateral alliances but also networking among allies was critical to reinforcing stability and leverage vis-à-vis China, Russia, and North Korea.

But could this breakthrough eventually collapse as so many have in the past? There are some weaknesses to watch.

President Yoon Suk Yeol, left, U.S. President Joe Biden, center, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida pose for a commemorative photo after their first exclusive tripartite summit at Camp David on Aug. 19. [YONHAP]

First, polls show that a large majority of Koreans still believe Japan has not done enough to amend for the past. Since Korea’s suffering under Japan is so prominent in Korean popular culture and history textbooks and barely noticeable in Japan’s, there is not a natural base of political support for more big bold moves by the government in Tokyo even though there is some expectation of more from many Koreans. On the other hand, the Japanese public response to the agreement has been more positive, and that could present fertile ground for people-to-people exchanges and educational efforts to reflect on more painful periods of history between the two countries.

Second, while Biden and his team have been focused, determined, and nuanced in supporting Korea-Japan reconciliation … there is no guarantee that the next administration in Washington will be as committed or effective, particularly if Donald Trump makes a comeback.

Third, the opposition Democratic Party in Korea could spoil the reconciliation by campaigning against Japan in National Assembly elections. The same danger always exists on the right in Japan, though it will likely be muted as long as the agreement holds in Korea.

On the other hand, the institutionalization of trilateral cooperation and the growth of Korean security cooperation with other allies close to Japan, such as Australia, will reinforce the Camp David moment. And structurally, the growing challenge from China, provocations from North Korea, and belligerence from Russia — plus the increasing alignment among Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang — will all sustain a strong structural rational for trilateral U.S.-Japan-Korea security cooperation. And that is a setback that Xi, Putin and Kim Jong-un did not see coming.