Seven keys to upgrading trilateral relations

The government must exercise wisdom in finding the diplomatic room to maneuver and lessen the burden by building trust through consistent and active contribution to the trilateral body.

Shin Kak-soo

The author, a former deputy foreign minister, is a senior advisor at the law firm Shin & Kim and a member of the diplomacy and security division of the JoongAng Ilbo’s Reset Korea campaign.

The Korea-Japan-U.S. summit will be held at Camp David on Aug. 18. Since the trilateral summit was restored for the first time in five years at the 2022 NATO summit in Madrid, Spain, the leaders of the three countries held several similar events on the sidelines of multilateral summits. Following a joint declaration at the trilateral summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia to establish the basic direction of the exclusive summit, the three countries have moved forward.

The acceleration of the trilateral cooperation system owes much to improved Korea-Japan relations. At the upcoming summit, measures will be discussed to jointly respond to the North Korean nuclear threat, security on the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, the spread of authoritarianism, and other challenges to the liberal international order. What attitude should Korea take to develop the trilateral cooperation system?

First, Korea, Japan and the United Sates have different national powers, national interests, and positions regarding the trilateral cooperation. The current Korean government — which aims to become a global pivotal country and is active in the trilateral cooperation — has expanded its targets to the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. The United States — which underscores trilateral cooperation in its Asia strategy amid its deepening strategic competition with China — wants to build a strong cooperation system with Korea and Japan to strengthen small-scale multilateral networks in its Indo-Pacific strategy. Japan has changed its stance with the improvement of Korea-Japan relations after focusing on other security mechanisms — such as the QUAD, NATO and its own Indo-Pacific strategy — in the wake of deteriorating Korea-Japan ties. Korea must mull over how to overcome the asymmetry of national powers and vulnerabilities with the U.S. and Japan while trying to maximize synergies by skillfully coordinating their different perspectives.

Second, Korea must pursue a trilateral cooperation benefiting our identity and capabilities. As a country that succeeded in democratization, Korea should promote democracy and human rights in the Indo-pacific region, maintain a free trade system and play a role in bridging Global South with developed countries based on its experience as a developing country. As a middle power, Korea must strive to establish a norms-based regional order as well as secure strategies and cutting-edge technologies to maintain its national competitiveness as a resource-poor country.

Third, Korea must propose important agenda items that reflect national interests while simultaneously covering regional and global issues. These items include efforts to denuclearize North Korea while strengthening nuclear deterrence, reinforcing sanctions against the North, and improving human rights in Pyeongyang, while also preparing mutual support systems in case of supply chain disruptions, establishing an economic security consultative body, cooperating on nuclear energy, cyber and space cooperation, and jointly responding to climate change.

Fourth, Korea must resolutely deal with Chinese resistance and pressure based on principles. At the same time, the country must avoid aggravating the U.S.-China contest with excessive rhetoric and calmly focus on achieving concrete accomplishments. Korea must also make efforts to ease the China-U.S. competition and urge Washington and Beijing to cooperate on issues such as climate change and the global health crisis, which require their cooperation.

Fifth, the government must fully explain to the people and media about the importance of Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation and managing its relations with China. Over the past decade, the general public was accustomed to the strategic ambiguity of “working with the U.S. for security while working with China for the economy.” Explaining the change in foreign policy and subsequent impact is particularly crucial to secure a driving force to push forward with the policy. In particular, persuading the public is particularly important for Korea-Japan cooperation in the security field, since it is still a sensitive issue.

Sixth, a pillar that helps maintain the Korea-Japan-U.S. cooperation is Korea-Japan relations. Although the bilateral relations have improved, it has not been fully recovered and requires careful management by Korea. Furthermore, the country needs to create a virtuous cycle in which the achievements of trilateral cooperation contribute to the quick stabilization of Korea-Japan relations.

Finally, Korea must proactively participate in the institutionalization of the continuity of the trilateral cooperation. It is necessary to create trilateral consultative bodies of ministers, high-ranking officials, and working-level officials in major fields and hold the meetings regularly. To systemize the cooperation, Korea needs to consider the idea of establishing a permanent secretariat in Korea modeling the Korea-China-Japan trilateral cooperation secretariat in Seoul. To enhance the continuity and effectiveness of the trilateral cooperation system, it is desirable to launch an issue-based open platform to include Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

The trilateral cooperation system can offer an opportunity for the countries to weather the complex great transition period, but it could also be a burden as Korea still has many vulnerabilities. The government must exercise wisdom in finding the diplomatic room to maneuver and lessen the burden by building trust through consistent and active contribution to the trilateral body.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.