Prepare to join the G7 plus

When Korea will have the chance is uncertain, but it must thoroughly prepare for the day.

Shin Kak-soo

The author, a former vice foreign minister, is a senior advisor at the law firm Shin & Kim and a member of the diplomacy and security division of the JoongAng Ilbo’s Reset Korea campaign. The post-Cold War international order is undergoing a major shift from the Ukraine war amid the deepening U.S.-China rivalry. Coupled with mega challenges such as the Covid-19, climate disaster, energy transition, digitalization, and population cliff, the world is headed to unprecedented confusion. The globe has been fragmented into a U.S.-led group of democracies, a league of authoritarian states such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, and Global South which is not aligned to either of them. The alarming developments raise the need for diplomatic safety nets and multilateralism. In that vein, Korea’s joining the ranks of the Group of Seven (G7) countries draws keen attention.

Starting as G5 for consultation among the U.S., Japan, Germany, the UK, and France in 1975 after the Nixon shock and oil shock in the early 1970s, it expanded to G7 after accepting Italy and Canada the following year. Russia became an official member of G7 in 1998, but lost its membership in 2018, four years after its annexation of Crimea. The European Union (EU) — represented by the presidents of the European Council and the European Commission — has attended G7 summits as a “non-enumerated” member since 1981.

After the rise of China in particular, G7’s GDP noticeably declined to 46 percent of the world’s in 2022 — or $44 trillion — from 70 percent in the beginning, but G7 still flexes its muscles on global economic, diplomatic and security issues. After the de facto neutralization of the UN Security Council from the frequent exercise of veto by Russia and China, G7’s role is growing as some sort of a “Western committee” to jointly deal with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China’s offensive diplomatic and security policy, and other regional disputes. The 40-page joint statement from the Hiroshima G7 summit in May covered nearly all global issues.

Korea must look at the expansion of G7 from the perspective of “global governance” to deal with global challenges. Due to the weakened influence of G7 on the global economy, G20 was launched in 2008 to cope with the global financial crisis that year. But due to its inability to deal with political issues in the face of oppositions from emerging countries — and due to a lack of homogeneity among members — G20 has showed the limits since the war in Ukraine.

Under such circumstance, the idea of expanding G7 to G10 by inviting countries sharing the same values and interest gained momentum after former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson proposed to add Korea, Australia and India — and further expand it to G11 following Donald Trump’s proposal to add Russia — but no progress has been made because of oppositions from the UK, Germany and Canada. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida adhered to Tokyo’s opposition to Korea’s participation in the G7 plus. Given the need for a consensus among existing members, it takes time for Korea to join the exclusive group, but once the G7 decides to broaden it, Korea is a good candidate.

If G7 is enlarged in the process of building a new international order, Korea must grasp the chance. Otherwise, the country must follow the international norms created by the precious few — instead of establishing them for others to follow. Korea’s joining the prestigious group will carry great significance as the maintenance and development of a liberal international order is the very foundation for Korea’s peace and prosperity.

When Korea will have the chance is uncertain, but it must thoroughly prepare for the day. First of all, Korea had better join the G7+ at an appropriate time. If it joins too early, it will have trouble meeting the obligations and other requirements for the group. If it joins too late, it could miss the chance forever.

Second, Korea’s participation in the G7+ signifies a great paradigm shift for its diplomacy as it represents an elevated stature of the country as a middle power in the West. However, given the divided land, its heavy reliance on foreign countries for trade, and its perennial geopolitical risks, Korea must brood over how to address obvious constraints in its strategic autonomy from its participation in the G7+.

Third, Korea’s preparedness for the G7+ is still lacking, as seen in the deep-rooted chauvinism, victimhood, and substandard diplomatic awareness among the general public. The public consciousness and political culture should be enhanced to meet the international standards.

Fourth, an extreme conflict between the conservatives and liberals over the direction of diplomacy will make it difficult for the government to grab the opportunity. That demands fixing a bipartisan position on the country’s entry into the club and an integral preparation from the government.

Last, Korea must hurry to nurture diplomatic talent and prepare fiscal resources to meet the obligations required from the international community.

Korea attended the G7 summits on four occasions — in Japan (2008), Italy (2009), Britain (2021) and Japan (2023) — all as a guest. The country needs to continue participating in the summit as a guest in close connection and cooperation with its European members. In particular, Korea must show tangible results by joining a number of networks led by G7 and its individual members so that the country can prove its merits. The door to the G7+ will surely be opened to Korea on its path to become a global pivotal country.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.