Clarify roles of the Unification Ministry and NIS

The overhaul on the Unification Ministry should be addressed from a micro perspective, leaving aside the issue of fundamental authority.

Wi Sung-lacThe author is a former South Korean representative to the six-party talks and head of the diplomacy and security division of the JoongAng Ilbo’s Reset Korea campaign.

An American soldier fleeing across the heavily armed inter-Korean border into North Korea has unexpectedly focused attention on possible talks between Washington and Pyongyang.

The attention is understandable as there has been little contact between Pyongyang and either Washington or Seoul for the last four years. But what matters is the will of the North Korean regime and what process it takes in renewing contacts.

To understand Pyongyang’s move, North Korea’s latest actions and circumstances should be studied. Externally, North Korea has been ratcheting up saber-rattling and provocations. Internally, it is struggling with worsening economic woes. The Covid-19 lockdown has aggravated livelihoods on top of lengthy sanctions. Strategically, Pyongyang should work up its leverage by flaunting its nuclear and missile capabilities before it condescendingly agrees to dialogue. But realistically, it must reach out for outside exchanges and help to help people survive. On the surface, Pyongyang maintains a cool face. But a closer look discovers busy footwork under the table. Signals have been going to and from Pyongyang and Tokyo. When North Korea officially ends its self-imposed Covid-19 isolation, Japan could be the country’s contact. North Korea entertained Chinese and Russian officials with a military parade on its 70th anniversary of the “Victory Day” commemorating the end of the 1950-1953 Korea War on July 27. They were first outsiders since the pandemic. It is unclear whether North Korea is fully reopening its borders. If so, it could send athletes to the Asian Games in Hangzhou in September. The developments and movements indicate North Korea renewing contact with the outside world. The crossing by an American soldier amidst the background could persuade Pyongyang to renew dialogue with Washington.

How the inter-Korean relationship fits into this new dynamic is uncertain. While talking with Washington and Tokyo, Pyongyang could stay cool towards Seoul. The conservative government in Seoul also may not be that eager to renew talks, given its hardening policies towards North Korea and external affairs.

But renewed dialogue between Pyongyang and Tokyo as well as Washington while Seoul is pushed to the sidelines could not be good for Korea’s diplomatic maneuvering room. The government, with its hardline position towards Pyongyang, may not be happy about the renewed dialogues, but it cannot expect Washington and Tokyo to care. At the end of the day, Seoul also would have to reach out to Pyongyang. The pattern had been common under past conservative governments.

So, who will break the ice between the two Koreas? Will the Unification Ministry be in charge? Most think the overture task would fall on the National Intelligence Service (NIS), since the spy agency had led talks with the North under the long-kept tradition since the military regime.

The Unification Ministry is being targeted for intensive reform for its past support to the North. The divisions in charge of dialogue, exchanges, and cooperation could face disciplinary actions. Such move could weaken the ministry’s role in communicating with the North as well as its overall rank and position. The ministry’s function in inter-Korean affairs could diminish. The intelligence agency could take over some of the Unification Ministry’s function to regain the past authority in inter-Korean affairs.

The NIS’s role in the past had been justified under the ceasefire status quo. The Unification Ministry inevitably had to stay in the back seat and could not take charge in overall inter-Korean affairs. Pyongyang, being well aware of the status quo, also has not taken the Unification Ministry seriously, influencing inter-Korean negotiations. The practice has not helped the NIS that much. The agency, too, suffered distortion in its function, which is understandable as the office spying on North Korean officials were addressing them in talks. In advanced countries, an espionage agency does not directly negotiate with other governments.

For a country invited to Group of Seven summits to continue with such abnormal practice serves neither the Unification Ministry nor the intelligence office well. Since the Unification Ministry is regarded as a reform target, whether such abnormalities should be retained should also be studied. The role of the Unification Ministry should be normalized by clarifying the division of tasks with the intelligence office. Whether it renews talks with Pyongyang on goodwill or confrontation, the Unification Ministry should take charge of inter-Korean affairs. Other offices should cooperate with intelligence and other support so that the ministry can be maneuver inter-Korean relationship effectively.

The overhaul on the Unification Ministry should be addressed from a micro perspective, leaving aside the issue of fundamental authority. Reform or overhaul should be carried out, while respecting the original function of the ministry. Such common sense action would help the Unification Ministry, NIS and inter-Korean relationship. The move would be regarded as normalization of the abnormal at home and abroad.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.