Conditions for NCG’s successful operation

At the next NCG meeting, South Korea and the U.S. must come up with necessary supplementary measures to counter North Korea’s mounting nuclear threats.

Cho Nam-hoonThe author is a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. The first meeting of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) between South Korea and the United States was held in Seoul on June 18. The core consultative body between Seoul and Washington to discuss measures to ensure the extended deterrence has finally kicked off. This NCG meeting is held in accordance with the Washington Declaration, which was agreed to at the Korea-U.S. summit in April to enhance the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and expand related measures. At the time, the agreement focused on the principles and broad framework of the extended deterrence by leaving detailed action plans to be fixed through the following NCG meetings.

The Washington Declaration was the best possible option satisfying both South Korea and the U.S. in the circumstance where redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula had little operational benefit. Through the meeting, South Korea can deepen its understanding of America’s decision-making process on nuclear use and help raise efficiency in deterring and responding to the North’s nuclear provocation. On its part, the U.S. can continue its non-proliferation policy by limiting the possibility of South Korea developing nuclear weapons on its own.

But the Washington Declaration does not completely guarantee the flawless and effective provision of extended deterrence by the U.S. It requires efforts to make the Washington Declaration — a general framework — take a concrete form with detailed follow-up measures. This is why the Korea-U.S. NCG meeting is very important.

President Yoon Suk Yeol, center, speaks before South Korea and the United States have their first Nuclear Consultative Group meeting on July 18 in the presidential office in Seoul. To the left of the president is Kurt Campbell, the White House National Security Council coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs, and to the right of the president is Cho Tae-yong, the National Security Adviser to Yoon.

With the first NCG meeting held in Seoul, the two allies have taken their meaningful first step toward realizing the “Korea-U.S. integrated extended deterrence.” The timely arrival of the USS Kentucky — an Ohio-class U.S. strategic nuclear submarine — at Busan Harbor backs it up. In the future, both countries must focus their efforts on finding the best way to deter, and respond to, North Korean nuclear threats. To do so, both sides are required to take the following steps.

First, South Korea’s participation in the nuclear decision-making process should be visualized at a faster pace through the NCG. To this end, close information sharing and joint planning between the two must be carried out after establishing required systems. The NCG is the world’s first bilateral nuclear consultative body, which is distinct from the multilateral nuclear-sharing system between the U.S. and NATO. South Korea and the U.S. must establish a system that can demonstrate its own strengths while referring to NATO’s case. To this end, South Korea’s prior participation in the process of discussing sensitive issues — such as the target, means and scale of nuclear use — must be fully guaranteed even if the U.S. president makes the final decision in case of emergency.

Second, both sides must conduct various simulations on possible emergencies. No matter who uses them, nuclear weapons can trigger massive ramifications on various scenarios. So both sides must prepare in advance for what problems may arise and how to respond.

Therefore, military personnel from both countries must participate in the execution of various simulations. But most of all, we need a simulation participated in by top-level policymakers of Seoul and Washington. This is because the understanding and determination of the highest-level policymakers of both allies is crucial to the actual use of nukes.

Nuclear response by the U.S. is not simply a military issue. It is a problem that requires justification for its use or persuasion for nonuse. The important thing is that the trust of the alliance must never be broken under any circumstances. It is necessary for the top policymakers to mutually understand the situation and learn the procedures based on military, policy and political factors.

Lastly, South Korea also must establish its own nuclear response system that corresponds to NCG activities. It is not easy for North Korea, which is well aware of South Korea’s economic and warfare capabilities, to use nuclear weapons against the South despite a possibility of going to war. So, if the U.S. extended deterrence functions flawlessly, the possibility of the North using nuclear weapons is not that high.

Nevertheless, we have to thoroughly prepare for a possible contingency in which the North has to use nuclear weapons against all odds. The military must advance the Korean-style three axis system — comprised of the Kill Chain pre-emptive strike system, the Korean Air and Missile Defense system, and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation plan — while the government must establish a nuclear response training system, which includes the possibility of nuclear attacks from the North.

The public also must actively participate in civil defense drills to prepare for a large-scale nuclear attack. We must build a triangle of civil, government and military measures for effective nuclear deterrence and response measures that can be used for exercises.

The first NCG meeting ended smoothly despite the North’s show of force, including the firing of an ICBM. At the next NCG meeting, South Korea and the U.S. must come up with necessary supplementary measures to counter North Korea’s mounting nuclear threats.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.