Rules changing as Korea-U.S. alliance turns 70

In the face of a growing geopolitical divide reminiscent of the Cold War era, Seoul and Washington celebrate the 70th anniversary of their alliance this year. But is the relationship really “ironclad” today, as both sides say it is?

Korean and U.S. Air Force pilots conduct a joint drill at Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, last month. Seen in the backdrop is an A-10 subsonic attack aircraft. [KOREAN AIR FORCE]

━ Partnership as relevant as ever, but can’t be taken for granted

Alliance at year 70: First in a four-part series

In light of the shifting geopolitical situation and growing risk factors in the region, the alliance between South Korea and the United States has transformed and evolved over the past 70 years. The Korea-U.S. alliance now stands at a crossroads as it marks its 70th anniversary and the relationship advances into a more global and comprehensive partnership. In a four-part series, the Korea JoongAng Daily will examine the various challenges faced by the allies in terms of diplomatic, security, economic and people-to-people cooperation and discuss possible ways forward. – Ed.

The South Korea-U.S. alliance — often described as one of the most successful of its kind — has faced, and overcome, many trials and tribulations over the past seven decades.

Since coming into office, Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol placed relations with the United States as a top priority in a shift away from the previous administration, which sought a more balanced approach with China.

During their first summit in Seoul on May 21, Yoon and U.S. President Joe Biden agreed to upgrade bilateral relations to a "global comprehensive strategic alliance.”

The two sides agreed to further broaden the traditional security alliance, dating back to their 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, to encompass economic and technological cooperation.

In the face of a growing geopolitical divide reminiscent of the Cold War era, Seoul and Washington celebrate the 70th anniversary of their alliance this year, highlighted by Yoon’s state visit to the United States this week.

But is the relationship really “ironclad” today, as both sides say it is?

“The alliance remains as relevant today as it was in the 1950s,” said Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center and former CIA deputy division chief for Korea. “Since its inception, the alliance has both enjoyed smooth sailing and suffered through squalls brought on by the actions of one country or the other. But the alliance endured because it was in the strategic interests of both countries to maintain their ties.”

Experts point out that while the alliance isn’t going away anytime soon, gone are the days that it can be taken for granted.

Leading scholars on alliance affairs in Korea and the United States weighed in that while Seoul-Washington security ties are enduring on the surface, they can be more fragile than it appears, taking into consideration the evolving geopolitical situation, the intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition and growing North Korea threats, in addition to domestic political factors.

South Korea can no longer expect the United States to unconditionally step in — whether it comes to extended deterrence, maintaining the full force of U.S. troops on the peninsula or economic security matters.

Instead, the alliance is evolving into a more nuanced relationship, one where reciprocity is needed in order to become more balanced partners on the global stage.

“There is much to celebrate as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. governments transform their Cold War alliance into a future-oriented ‘global comprehensive strategic alliance,’” said Andrew Yeo, senior fellow and the SK-Korea Foundation Chair at the Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies and professor of politics at The Catholic University of America, “but it also brings some challenges and likely some growing pains.”

President Yoon Suk Yeol, right, looks at U.S. President Joe Biden at a joint press conference after their first bilateral summit at the presidential office in Yongsan, central Seoul, on May 21, 2022. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

Hurdles faced by the alliance

Despite the two allies’ “seamless” military alliance, Koreans face fears of abandonment by the United States amid the shifting geopolitical situation and the growing unpredictability of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats.

Such persistent distrust and anxieties were further fueled by former U.S. President Donald Trump’s multiple threats to pull or reduce U.S. troops in allied countries and withdraw the American nuclear umbrella over the region, causing Koreans to become increasingly anxious that the alliance may not be as infallible as they once believed.

The Yoon administration, from its onset in May last year, stressed that the Korea-U.S. alliance is back and stronger than ever.

Biden also has emphasized that the United States will be prioritizing its allies again, in an apparent turnaround from the “America First” rhetoric of the Trump administration.

But Seoul’s woes continued with the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS and Science Act, which are concerning to Korean automakers and chipmakers.

Recently, leaked classified Pentagon documents indicated that U.S. intelligence authorities may have been spying on allied countries, including Korean presidential aides’ internal deliberations on supplying military aid to Ukraine in the war with Russia.

Some of these issues are expected to be tackled in Yoon’s bilateral summit with Biden in Washington on April 26, the first such state visit in 12 years.

The state visit is primarily to mark the 70th anniversary of the alliance but could be an occasion to discuss aligning the two countries’ Indo-Pacific strategies, coordinating North Korea policy and addressing cooperation for economic security and supply chain stability.

It comes as the United States has been making it clear that it wants its allies to pick sides amid the intensifying strategic competition which seems to pit U.S.-led democracies against rising authoritarian rule. The division comes amid the growing U.S.-China rivalry, Russia’s war with Ukraine and North Korea’s escalated missile and nuclear pursuits.

Experts point out that Seoul could do more to stick up for the Indo-Pacific region out of its own volition, rather than only when Washington prods at its back.

“When the principles, values and sovereignty of Indo-Pacific nations are under attack, one would hope South Korea would, on its own, implement measures to defend them rather than depicting them as ‘U.S. demands for anti-China coalitions,’” said Klingner. “Other nations, such as Japan and Australia, have been far bolder than South Korea in calling out China for its transgressions against its neighbors and domestic human rights violations.”

Similarly, he noted South Korea “lagged behind other nations” in its initial response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year.

Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, pointed out that South Korea has until recently shied away from U.S.-led groupings meant to strengthen solidarity in the Indo-Pacific region that might “offend” China.

“It was an appeasement policy to China in order to enable an engagement policy with North Korea that had the effect of isolating South Korea among the democracies in Asia,” said Cha.

“It has now become impossible to strike a balance between the United States and China,” said Prof. Kim Hyun-wook, director-general of the Department of American Studies at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KDNA). “The United States has now become a country busy taking care of its own interests, that has to promote ‘America first.’ In the past, even if Korea raised complaints against the United States, it was always steadfast as an ally, but we are not dealing with that United States anymore.”

He warned that Seoul has been relegated to a “second-tier ally” during its period of hesitance, positioning itself between Beijing and Washington over the past several Korean administrations.

Kim said now is the time for Korea to “make a choice” between the United States and China.

“When it comes to the Korea-U.S. alliance, we still have this image in our minds that the United States will protect us and provides us with security, and forever be our ally no matter what,” Kim said. “It’s now time to change that perception of being a patron ally.”

He said Koreans “need to slightly lower our expectations of the United States,” and stop reminiscing of the days of America’s enormous economic power during the past Cold War era, with its unlimited capacity to provide military and economic support to Europe and Asia.

“The United States has become such a country that we have to negotiate and compromise with,” Kim said. “We need to examine what our core and vital interests are, as well as the interests of the United States, and find a process in which we can compromise and share them, because a unilateral alliance where we do things just because the United States tells us to won’t last very long.”

With a similar message, Yoon in a Cabinet meeting on April 18 said that the Korea-U.S. alliance "is not a relationship swayed by interests, but one based on the universal values of a liberal democracy and market economy.”

He stressed that the two countries “are a resilient value-based alliance that can fully adjust even if there is a conflict of interest or a problem arises,” in reference to the U.S. wiretapping allegations.

Korean President Syngman Rhee, center, watches Foreign Minister Byun Young-tae, front row left, and U.S. Secretary of State John Dulles, front row right, sign a provisional mutual defense treaty on Aug. 8, 1953 in Seoul. [JOONGANG PHOTO]

The forging of an alliance

Last year, the two allies marked the 140th anniversary of diplomatic ties, dating back to the signing of the the 1882 Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910) and the United States.

But the alliance between Seoul and Washington took shape in the modern sense with the arrival of U.S. troops in Korea after World War II and the U.S. military's participation in the three-year Korean War, which ended with an armistice agreement on July 27, 1953.

The United States sent 1.79 million troops, the largest number among those nations participating in the war through the UN Command, and 37,000 American soldiers were killed.

On Oct. 1, 1953, the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in Washington, establishing an official military alliance. Through the treaty, which entered into force on Nov. 18, 1954, the two countries could jointly defend against external armed attacks, and the United States stationed its troops in South Korea in its defense.

It was the fourth security pact negotiated by the United States with an Asia-Pacific nation — after Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Japan.

Seoul and Washington in the treaty recognized their “common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area.”

They called to strengthen their efforts for “collective defense for the preservation of peace and security.

“South Korea, like any country reliant on another for a portion of its security, will be nervous about the commitment of its ally,” Klingner said. “But the allies have remained shoulder to shoulder for 70 years, not only out of tradition and honor, but out of necessity. The North Korean threat remains today, with even greater weapons of devastation.”

Korea has come a long way from its days as a war-torn country completely dependent on the United States for defense, through its rapid economic development and political transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

Despite hitting rough patches along the way, including a surge in anti-American sentiment after a U.S. Army vehicle hit and killed two Korean middle school girls in 2002 and massive protests over a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) signed in 2007, the two countries have emerged as mutually beneficial partners sharing similar values and interests.

In 2009, the two countries upgraded their relations to a “comprehensive strategic alliance” of bilateral, regional and global scope.

The FTA took effect in 2012 and has served beyond a basic framework for economic cooperation and a symbol of expanding bilateral trade.

“No alliance of the United States has transformed more in the modern era than that with Korea,” Cha said. “Korea went from being one of the poorest countries in the world to an OECD Development Assistance Committee [DAC] country within one generation.”

“The establishment of United States Forces Korea [USFK], in its Combined Forces Command format, means that the integration of the U.S. and ROK military is extremely tight, arguably the tightest in the world, between two alliance partners,” said Mason Richey, associate professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. “There are no two major militaries as closely interoperable as the U.S. and South Korean militaries. And that was not always the case.”

Today, South Korea is sixth strongest military and the 10th largest economy in the world.

And the alliance is just as important, if not more so, than it was 70 years ago, not only for the defense of South Korea but for international solidarity. Seoul has leveraged its global standing, with a series of invitations to multilateral forums such as the NATO summit in Spain in June last year and the upcoming G7 summit in Hiroshima next month.

Korea’s soft power has grown as well, especially with its cultural and social influence through K-pop and entertainment content.

“Korea, although still a junior partner in the alliance, is much more capable than before, and the gap to the power with the United States is smaller than in previous generations,” said Richey. “So the two alliance partners have become more equal […] and Korea has become a much more meaningful partner to the United States because of its soft power growth and economic growth.”

Transition to a global partnership

In a joint statement last May, Yoon and Biden announced the upgrading of Korea-U.S. relations to a global comprehensive strategic alliance “firmly rooted in the shared values of promoting democracy and the rules-based international order, fighting corruption, and advancing human rights.”

They broadened coordination in military and security affairs to shared values and economic and technological cooperation, especially in light of the transformation of the international trade order and the disruption of global supply chains.

“The U.S.-South Korea alliance was intended to deter North Korea and defend South Korea from another invasion,” said Brookings Institution’s Yeo. “Since then, the alliance has expanded in function and scope over the past 70 years,” covering a broad range of traditional and non-traditional security issues including extended deterrence, missile defense, supply chain resilience, artificial intelligence, space cooperation, health, climate change, development finance and economic security.

Yeo said that although bilateral alliances in Asia were “created as part of a U.S. ‘power play’ to keep in check smaller allies, the South Korean government today exercises a much greater role and responsibility in the alliance decision-making process.”

He noted that the scope of the alliance has “geographically expanded over time to cover issues outside the defense of the Korean Peninsula.”

“The new moniker for the alliance is both a recognition of South Korea’s already extensive global role, as well as a pledge for even greater commitments by Seoul,” said Klingner. “President Yoon declared that South Korea will become a global pivotal state. But South Korea has already long punched above its weight on the diplomatic, economic and societal stage, and its forces have fought alongside the United States far from the Korean Peninsula.”

Klingner said that the Yoon administration’s new Indo-Pacific strategy and Seoul’s pledge to uphold the rule of law and protect the principles shared by democracies is “commendable.”

The Yoon administration has distanced itself from the preceding Moon Jae-in administration’s peace initiative focused on diplomacy with North Korea.

Last December, the Yoon administration announced its strategy for a free, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, its version of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, widely seen as one of Biden’s initiatives to contain China’s rising assertiveness in the region.

Other similar U.S. coalitions include those involving Seoul, such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and the so-called Chip 4 alliance with South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, among the United States, Japan, Australia and India — of which Korea is not a part.

Cha welcomed Yoon’s recent diplomatic overtures to Tokyo to resolve the issue of compensation of Japan’s wartime forced labor victims. He noted this move opened up opportunities for Seoul’s participation in Quad, G7, and other groupings “that make South Korea stronger vis-à-vis China, North Korea, Russia.”

On March 16, Yoon held a bilateral summit with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo, attempting to improve frayed ties due to a historical dispute and a trade spat, which comes as Washington has pushed for stronger trilateral cooperation with its East Asian allies.

“At the core, I believe this is an ‘ironclad’ alliance that goes beyond just security threats and economic interests, but is also connected by personal ties and through common values and principles,” Yeo said.

“It would be difficult for the U.S. to pursue supply chain resilience or economic security without Korea’s cooperation,” he added. “However, the Yoon government recognizes that by not joining other like-minded allies and partners, it loses out on an opportunity to shape regional economic order and may find itself at a disadvantageous position in the long run.”

Such shifts in the alliance “mean that Korea has become a much more integral and valuable partner to the U.S. in supporting regional peace and stability and a rules-based liberal international order,” Yeo said.

American experts noted that there is generally bipartisan backing of the alliance within the Congress, while in Korea there is a stronger conservative-leaning support.

Nonetheless, “deeper polarization in U.S. politics has brought a greater element of uncertainty with U.S. foreign policy,” Yeo pointed out.

Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, right, and U.S. President Joe Biden toast each other at an official dinner at the National Museum of Korea in central Seoul on May 21, 2022. [PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE]

Future direction of the alliance

“Think where man’s glory most begins and ends. And say my glory was I had such friends.”

Yoon quoted the passage from W.B. Yeats’ (1865-1939) poem, “The Municipal Gallery Revisited,” during the official dinner hosted for Biden at the National Museum of Korea on May 21.

The Irish poet is widely known as a favorite of the U.S. president, and Biden stressed, “Revitalizing this alliance was one of my key foreign policy priorities when I took office last year.”

Calling for the flourishing of the alliance for the decades to come, Biden said, “We go together,” the well-known motto of the Combined Forces Command that is symbolic of the long-standing Korea-U.S. alliance.

But seven decades since the signing of the mutual defense treaty, are the two allies as inseparable and unified in all aspects as their militaries appear to be?

“It is my view that the U.S. will never abandon Korea,” Cha said. “Japan will always be a U.S. ally. China will always be a competitor of sorts. That makes Korea the crucial piece. If the U.S. loses Korea, it loses Asia.”

He added just as Koreans may still fear U.S. abandonment, some Americans also worry that Koreans may bail out on the United States over issues such as a Taiwan contingency, noting that the two allies “need to reassure each other.”

But an eventual reduction of American troops stationed in Korea is not out of question.

“The complete abandonment of the alliance is unlikely anywhere in the near future,” Yeo said. “There may be a day when the U.S. and ROK decide that security on the Korean Peninsula and in the region may not require all 28,500 troops, and we may see some reductions if the security environment changes and peace and stability are achieved on the Korean Peninsula. But even in the scenario of Korean unification, I believe the alliance will still exist.”

Experts generally weighed in that Korea may have to step up its game both to make the bilateral alliance more enduring and for its own survival as it may increasingly need to play a vital role in the ongoing Sino-U.S. competition.

“The time has come for Korea to play a leadership role in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy,” said Kim. “Korea has to play a leading role in forming the norms, together with the United States. We can't just be a follower like we are now; we have to become the rule setters.”

Kim likewise pointed out that Koreans need to be “prepared for a scenario where U.S. hegemony declines” and the number of U.S. troops on the peninsula is “drastically reduced,” which is where arguments for Seoul’s nuclear armament come into play.

“The larger geopolitical geostrategic issues in East Asia today mean that the alliance is relevant for regional stability and security architecture in East Asia,” Richey said.

He noted that South Korea is “an important component of an overall U.S. balancing strategy,” referring to U.S. attempts to balance China's regional advantages in East Asia.

“Obviously, the U.S. will remain South Korea's security guarantor, there's no dispute — there's no possibility that that's going to change in the short- or medium-term future,” Richey said. But he advised Korea to “look more aggressively at diversifying its partners,” in order to lessen its dependence on one country economically.

“The U.S. abandoning its alliance with South Korea would be a reckless impertinent act that violates American commitments, values and bedrock principles,” Klingner said. Such action would have “severely dire consequences for America’s reputation” and its other allies and partnerships.

“One would hope that eventually the military necessity of the alliance would wither away once the North Korean threat disappears and the Korean Peninsula is peacefully reunited based on the principles of freedom, democracy and the rule of law,” Klingner added. “But, until that day, the alliance will remain crucial for the defense of South Korea and in the strategic interests of the United States.”

BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]