[Column] No historical bet without a grand frame

A leader must present the people with a frame of persuasion that compresses the light and shadow — and the dreams and risks — of a historical choice.

Jaung HoonThe author is a professor of political science at Chung-Ang University and a columnist for the JoongAng Ilbo. Preparations to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Korea-U.S. alliance seemed to be perfect until March. Given Korea’s dramatic rise to a global powerhouse in the chip, battery and defense industries from a small country in Asia through the 70 years of the alliance, President Yoon Suk Yeol deserved to celebrate the 70th anniversary and declare a new era in his state visit to the United States next week. The president certainly would have been elated over his upcoming visit to Washington with leaders of conglomerates who are investing billions of dollars in the U.S.

But unlike all the excitement from the presidential office, Korean people show a lukewarm reaction to the trip. There are two factors. First, suspicions arose that the United States had spied on top Korean officials, followed by Seoul’s half-baked response to calm the controversy. The second factor is the lack of framing for the president to explain his crusade to deepen the seven-decade alliance.

President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden smile before having their first summit in Seoul, May 21, 2022. [PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE]

When we look into the first factor, Yoon replaced his national security advisor before the first state visit in 10 years. Then, a series of allegations were made that the United States had eavesdropped on conversations of top security aides to the president. Just like the precedents in Israel and Germany, Seoul is rushing to fix the situation. But the people have noticed the embarrassment of the government.

Despite the short-term issue, I believe Yoon’s upcoming visit is a historic bet that will determine Korea’s future for the next two decades — just like former President Park Chung Hee’s visit to Washington in 1961 to meet with President John F. Kennedy was a bet to set the foundation for Korea’s rapid industrialization in the following 20 years. The Korea-U.S. free trade agreement pushed by President Roh Moo-hyun despite his anti-U.S. inclinations also served as a stepping stone for Korea to become a manufacturing powerhouse in the following 20 years.

Just like that, President Yoon will make a critical bet to ensure the country’s survival in the new Cold War by stressing an economic alliance and Korea’s participation in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Strategy. Even without mentioning the importance of economic security, chip supply chains and cooperation in the artificial intelligence sector, betting on the new alliance at this point is an inevitable and obvious choice.

The problem is a critical dearth of the internal framework for the government to explain such historic betting. Centrists and the young generation do not support an unconditional deepening — and expansion — of Korea-U.S. relations. Even if it is an unavoidable choice, the language of persuasion that justifies the choice is essential. Yoon must present a bigger picture to the people by combining his grand national strategy and cementing the alliance.

If a leader fails to convince the people, the meaning of any historic betting is destined to fade. When former general-turned-president Park Chung Hee visited Kennedy at the White House in 1961, Washington greeted the new leader of Korea with doubts. Kennedy’s suspicion had grounds. It was well known that Park had strong antipathy toward Korean military generals on the road to success thanks to their connections with the U.S. even before he rose to power with his coup in 1961. Furthermore, the coup through the mobilization of the military was a huge embarrassment to the U.S., which had operational control of the Korean troops at the time.

Park, however, surprised Washington and Korea by making a historic bet that set the foundation for the alliance during the Cold War. He made a preemptive offer to dispatch Korean troops to the Vietnam War, in which the U.S. struggled. Park also restored the deadlocked Korea-Japan relations to help the country progress toward industrialization.

And yet, Park, a strongman, was unable to avoid the aftermath of his decision. At that time, university students and the people fiercely protested the dispatch of our troops to Vietnam and the resumption of talks to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan. The crisis in 1963, triggered by the troop dispatch and the normalization talks, eventually led to the biggest political crisis of Park’s regime during its early years.

Before his first visit to Washington in 2003, President Roh said, “I won’t just go to the U.S. for a photo opportunity.” But he made a bold bet to globalize the Korea-U.S. alliance. Despite fierce opposition from his aides, Roh decided to accept his U.S. counterpart George W. Bush’s request for troop deployment to Iraq. Later, he pushed for a free trade agreement with the U.S.

Roh’s decisions served as a basis for Korea to become the global leader in manufacturing in the following 20 years. But his supporters turned against him, and protests were strong inside his own party to oppose the dispatch of troops and “colonization” of the country.

For President Yoon, who calls himself a libertarian, strengthening the alliance with the U.S. would be a natural choice. He would certainly want to normalize the relations that were derailed during the previous administration.

But we do not call this a historic bet. We are standing at the point where the West and the East are colliding once again. The alliance of liberalism is an obvious choice for us, but a leader must present the people with a frame of persuasion that compresses the light and shadow — and the dreams and risks — of a historical choice. There is no historical bet without a grand frame.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.