Improve cyberwarfare capabilities

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration must augment cyberwarfare capabilities. We must find effective ways to neutralize the North’s nuclear threats by strengthening cyberwar capability.

Yoon Young-kwan

The author is an emeritus professor at Seoul National University and a former foreign minister. North Korea fired a barrage of missiles into the East Sea over the past two months, citing the threats from the resumed “South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises.” But on South Korea’s part, the joint drills were necessary as it became clear that the North spent the four-year period from 2018 advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities after the peace-loving Moon Jae-in administration suspended the joint drills. For instance, it is difficult for radar to detect and intercept a KN-23 short-range ballistic missile due to its fast speed and low-altitude flying. Such tactical weapons are aimed at overwhelming the enemy in the initial stage of war. An SLBM also can strike at the rear of our missile defense systems.

To effectively cope with missile provocations, you must reinforce deterrence, defense and combat readiness. North Korea’s strong opposition to such drills represents its quixotic demand “You stay put while I’ll prepare for the attack!”

The North’s strong response to the joint exercise seems to have two reasons. First, it is an external strategy. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will certainly return to the negotiating table at some point. On his part, strengthening military power is essential to consolidating his power base, but the economy is crucial too. At the moment, no one knows how many years the North Korean economy could withstand international sanctions.

If dialogue is to resume, North Korea would trade nuclear arms reduction — not denuclearization — for lifting sanctions or U.S. nuclear weapons reduction. To have the upper hand in such negotiations, Kim must escalate the level of his nuclear missile capability, raise tension to appropriate levels, and pressure his counterparts. In other words, Kim took action with future talks in his mind.

Second, the North’s strong response could be designed for domestic propaganda to instill a sense of pride among his people that the North Korean military has grown strong enough to fight against the South-U.S. Combined Forces.

If the tension continues, how should we respond? The key lies in a cool-headed response instead of panic. Security experts and government officials started talking about our countermeasures, including nuclear armaments, redeployment of tactical nukes, and nuclear sharing with the U.S. But whatever choice we make, we must push it in close cooperation with the U.S. so as not to burn down the barn to kill the rats.

The options mentioned above will likely do more harm than good. With regard to the development of nuclear weapons on our own, we need to look back at the vehement U.S. opposition to the idea pushed by president Park Chung Hee in the mid-1970s. The U.S. still opposes a South Korean government’s attempt to develop nuclear weapons. Decision makers in the U.S. would want to tell their South Korean counterparts that America successfully deterred the nuclear threats from the Soviets possessing even more nukes than North Korea’s. U.S. officials would say, “In addition, 28,000 U.S. soldiers are stationed in South Korea. What a stronger security assurance is there than that? Do you really want to develop nuclear weapons because you don’t trust us?”

If South Korea wants to develop nuclear weapons, it must closely coordinate with America and build its potential nuclear capabilities. It can refer to the case of Japan, which has been accumulating its nuclear capabilities through close consultation with the U.S. to produce it quickly when the need arises. If that model is to work for South Korea, Seoul must build strong trust with Washington.

The redeployment of tactical nukes or nuclear sharing has a problem. If nuclear weapons are brought in, they should be stored somewhere. But that place can be a primary target for enemy attacks. More effective than that is to deter the North’s nuclear threats by U.S. submarines or strategic bombers both carrying nuclear warheads, U.S. security experts advise. Moreover, if tactical nuclear weapons are deployed in South Korea, China and Russia, not to mention local residents, will oppose it vehemently. In the case of nuclear sharing, the ultimate decision maker is a U.S. president and that authority has never been shared with any other country.

The most reasonable choice is to reinforce the extended deterrence. U.S. Defense Department officials use the novel concept of “integrated deterrence” aimed at deterring enemy aggressions by combining all areas of military operations — including nuclear, conventional, cyber, space and information — with defense capabilities of allies. South Korea and the U.S. need to discuss ways to link the traditional deterrence to the new concept to deter the North’s nuclear threats.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration must augment cyberwarfare capabilities. The transition committee chose it as an agenda items for the new government. But it must speed it up. The U.S. demonstrated powerful cyberwar capabilities enough to retaliate for North Korea’s hacking of Sony Pictures in 2014. We must find effective ways to neutralize the North’s nuclear threats by strengthening cyberwar capability. If that is possible, we can ease our security concerns.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.