Kim Jong-un absent from SLBM test confirmed by N. Korea, signalling restraint
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In an article on July 23, 2019, the Rodong Sinmun reported that Kim Jong-un had "inspected a newly built submarine" that would "perform its duty in the operational waters of the East Sea of Korea," adding that "its operational deployment is near at hand."
This suggested that it was a tactical ballistic missile targeting nearby areas such as the Korean Peninsula and Japan, rather than a strategic ballistic missile targeting the US. Many analysts are speculating the SLBM may be an adapted form of the KN-23, a short-range surface-to-air missile that has been described as the "North Korean Iskander."
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North Korea’s Academy of Defence Science “test-fired a new type submarine-launched ballistic missile on Tuesday,” the Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported in a second-page article on Wednesday.
Leader Kim Jong-un was not present to observe the launch.
The newspaper quoted the academy as saying that it had “presented a report [. . .] of succeeding in the test-launch of new type SLBM from the same ‘8.24 Yongung’ ship from which the first submarine-launched strategic ballistic missile was successfully launched five years ago to demonstrate the military muscle of the DPRK.” This indicates that the new SLBM was launched with the use of an existing submarine.
The reference to “the same ‘8.24 Yongung’ ship from which the first submarine-launched strategic ballistic missile was successfully launched five years ago” is especially noteworthy.
Over five years ago, on Aug. 24, 2016, North Korea test-launched its first SLBM, the Pukguksong-1, from the waters off of Sinpo in South Hamgyong Province. The new report states that the latest launch used the same submarine that had served as a launch platform at the time.
Named after the initial launch date, the 8.24 Yongung has only one launch tube and measures 67 meters in length — making it smaller than other Gorae-class submarines, which are 100 meters long. It has not been put into combat position and is regarded as a submarine used for testing purposes.
The use of the 8.24 Yongung has led some analysts to surmise that despite its continued efforts, the North has not yet succeeded in developing a submarine that can launch a strategic SLBM during combat maneuvers.
In an article on July 23, 2019, the Rodong Sinmun reported that Kim Jong-un had “inspected a newly built submarine” that would “perform its duty in the operational waters of the East Sea of Korea,” adding that “its operational deployment is near at hand.”
South Korean and US military intelligence authorities have reportedly determined that no launch ceremony has yet been held for the submarine.
North Korea has never launched an SLBM from a submarine during actual maneuvers. On that basis, the international community has yet to officially recognize it as operating the missiles.
Following a successful underwater test launch of an independently developed SLBM from the 3,000-ton ROKS Dosan Ahn Changho on Sept. 15, the South Korean government announced, “The Republic of Korea is the seventh country in the world to launch an SLBM from a submarine.” North Korea was not included among the six countries to have previously succeeded — a list that consisted of the US, Russia, China, the UK, France, and India.
Other important details include the data and performance of the new SLBM.
South Korean and US military authorities reportedly determined that the missile flew for 590 kilometers (366 miles), with a maximum altitude of 60km (37 miles). On Tuesday, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to it as an “unidentified short-range ballistic missile that appears to have been an SLBM.”
This suggested that it was a tactical ballistic missile targeting nearby areas such as the Korean Peninsula and Japan, rather than a strategic ballistic missile targeting the US. Many analysts are speculating the SLBM may be an adapted form of the KN-23, a short-range surface-to-air missile that has been described as the “North Korean Iskander.”
In its past SLBM test launches, North Korea used the name “Pukguksong,” with the Pukguksong-1 launched in August 2016, the Pukguksong-2 in February and April 2017, and the Pukguksong-3 in October 2019. The fact that it didn’t use the “Pukguksong” name to refer to the “new type submarine-launched ballistic missile” that it claimed to have successfully test-launched is another notable departure.
If the Pukguksong missiles are intended as strategic ballistic missiles, then the latest test launch could be seen as involving a tactical missile.
The more pragmatic assessment of the missile as something that would “greatly contribute to putting the defence technology of the country on a high level and to enhancing the underwater operational capability of our navy” — in contrast with the test launch of the Pukguksong-3 on Oct. 2, 2019, which North Korea called a “historic strengthening of national defense capabilities” — can be read along the same lines.
In short, the test launch of a short-range ballistic missile from an existing submarine holds limited significance in political and military terms. The most crucial fact to consider is that the North did not violate its summit agreements with the US or step over the “red line” drawn by Washington.
That decision by Pyongyang seems to indicate an adjustment of the tenor of its activities, even as it makes a point of being uncompromising on the preconditions named by leader Kim Jong-un, including mutual respect and an end to “double-dealing” attitudes and hostile policies.
The fact that Kim was not present at the scene of the launch — after being similarly absent from five test launches of different forms of missiles in September — reads as a deliberate choice to distance himself.
A few analysts somewhat hopefully interpreted the SLBM test launch as “alleviating uncertainties.” This is based on the fact that the South Korean and US governments had both been predicting that the test launch of a strategic SLBM would be the biggest military action to be taken by the North this year.
After declaring the test launch of the Hwasong-15 on Nov. 29, 2017, to represent the “completion” of its nuclear armament, Pyongyang abruptly changed course toward dialogue and negotiations in 2018.
In view of that precedent, when asked by reporters Tuesday whether the latest steps could be taken as a signal that North Korea is ready to take part in dialogue, a Blue House official replied, “I think that interpretation is correct, and I hope that interpretation can be made.”
By Lee Je-hun, senior staff writer
Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]
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