Should the drone operations command really be dismantled?

Who, ultimately, will take responsibility for drone warfare? And can the ambitious slogan of training 500,000 drone warriors become reality?

Ko Jung-ae The author is the editor-in-chief at the JoongAng Sunday.

“Two decades on, I still live with the guilt of having failed to turn 'Army After Next' into a viable operational concept. In the end, success is not measured by the elegance of ideas but by how the Army weaponizes and structures itself to implement the ideas.”

Footage released by the Iranian state-affiliated Fars news agency reveals rows of drones stored in underground tunnels and mounted on rocket launchers with walls adorned by Iranian flags. [SCREEN CAPTURE]

This reflection came from retired Gen. Robert “Bob” Scales, former commandant of the U.S. Army War College, writing in 2018 on the military analysis platform War on the Rocks. In 1995 Scales led the “Army After Next” project, a study that attempted to envision the character of warfare in 2025.

Even then, he recognized the difficulties. The pace of change in warfare was accelerating while the military’s ability to build new weapons and reorganize its structure was slowing. Armed forces needed to look further into the future, yet the more distant the time horizon became, the more uncertain predictions were and the greater the risk of serious miscalculation. Despite these limitations, the project distilled several important ideas about the future battlefield.

By 1997, researchers believed they could outline a clear vision of future war. In retrospect, that assumption proved mistaken. Scales later wrote that external pressures also played a role. There were frequent demands to translate sweeping and sometimes grand strategic slogans into concrete military strategy every year or two. Imagining the future, he observed, was “like making a fine wine.” It required patience and careful refinement.

The “Army After Next” project was eventually terminated in 2008. But in 1999, Scales had already summarized 10 key themes. Among them was the argument that quick and decisive operations would be essential to winning future wars at minimal cost.

Lightweight and rapidly deployable units, he argued, would need the protection of what he called an “Unblinking Eye” if they were to defeat numerically superior and heavily armed adversaries. The term referred to a continuous, reliable and pervasive information advantage generated by unmanned aerial platforms.

The ongoing conflict involving the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other offers glimpses of the kind of warfare Scales anticipated. One example is the detection-and-strike capability that, according to weapons expert Farzin Nadimi, has reduced the expected survival time of Iranian missile operators to only a few hours.

There were also developments that Scales did not foresee. Drone warfare, which began to emerge in the 2010s, has evolved rapidly. In the current conflict, drones are increasingly being used almost like expendable munitions, according to Yoon Yong-jin, a professor at KAIST.

A drone allegedly sent by South Korea into North Korea on Sept. 27, 2025, is seen in this photo carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Jan. 10, 2026. [YONHAP]

The question is whether South Korea is prepared for such rapid changes.

People familiar with defense policy often begin with a sigh. Their concern does not stem only from reports that an advisory panel of the Ministry of National Defense recommended dismantling the Drone Operations Command. They also point to the absence of a clear alternative, even as slogans such as “training 500,000 drone warriors” circulate in public debate.

At a time when the need for an organization capable of researching drone tactics and strategy and planning large-scale operations is growing, some critics worry that drone operations themselves are being treated as something almost taboo.

A former military officer familiar with the issue said there is an atmosphere in which few people are willing to speak openly.

Maj. Gen. Kim Yong-dae, the former head of the Drone Operations Command, appears for questioning by a special counsel team at the Seoul High Prosecutors Office in southern Seoul on Sept. 18, 2025. [YONHAP]

“Some aspects of the Drone Operations Command were improvised under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration,” he said. “Its initial purpose was unclear and it overlapped with existing roles in each service branch. But it was gradually identifying its own missions and responsibilities. Is dismantling it justified simply because unmanned aircraft were sent across the border into North Korea?”

He added that the current political climate discourages open criticism. “Even mentioning martial law can lead to immediate suspension from duty, so military personnel and even those connected to the military are reluctant to voice objections. Many retired officers also work with defense companies and are cautious about speaking out. It is a very serious situation.”

Even if the command were dissolved, the question remains: who would handle drone operations?

“In the United States, the Army largely oversees drone strategy,” the former officer said. “South Korea needs broader discussion and preparation. But the debate is often conducted mainly by academics, while practitioners with experience in this field are excluded for various reasons.”

He also noted that some U.S. officials have privately expressed concern about South Korea’s situation. According to their assessments, North Korea’s drone technology and combat experience obtained from Russia could pose a serious threat.

Whether the Lee Jae Myung administration will entrust this role to the Army remains unclear. If the government cannot produce the “fine wine” Scales once described, is dismantling a command that had only begun to establish itself the right approach?

Who, ultimately, will take responsibility for drone warfare? And can the ambitious slogan of training 500,000 drone warriors become reality?

For now, the questions continue to multiply.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.