[Vera Songwe, Bernice Lee] How the world can reboot 'America First'

“There’s no question about it,” US President Donald Trump said at last month’s FIFA World Cup Final Draw ceremony: The game that Americans call soccer “is football,” and the United States has to “come up with another name” for its National Football League.

The cognitive dissonance was palpable. The high priest of “America First” had conceded that at least one example of American exceptionalism, however trivial, “really doesn’t make sense,” and suggested that the name of America’s most recognized domestic sport should be adjusted to fit global standards.

Behind Trump’s statement was self-interest: This year’s World Cup will offer a big, glitzy, and, judging by FIFA’s recent creation of a “peace prize” just for him, eager stage from which he can feed his insatiable appetite for praise. While Trump may not much care about building a better, fairer world order, it might be possible to harness his self-interest to advance one. There are several areas where the US might be willing to play by new global rules and promote broadly beneficial transformations.

First, the Trump administration acknowledges the need for international financial reforms, which, according to its new National Security Strategy, it will spearhead. For Trump, the objective is “preserving and growing” US financial dominance. But by pushing through reforms to International Monetary Fund voting shares and a new issuance of the IMF’s reserve asset, special drawing rights, the US could simultaneously reinforce the dollar’s position as a key reserve currency.

Second, the Trump administration recognizes that energy security must include nuclear power. The plan for strengthening US energy dominance laid out in the NSS opens the way for an additional solution beyond renewables: small modular reactors. If this innovation is to benefit America and serve as a global public good, the G20 -- which, as of December 1, is being presided over by the US -- should step up to establish relevant safety standards and export controls.

Third, Trump is seeking to corner the digital currency market, as demonstrated by the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for US Stablecoins Act. By using the G20 presidency to set shared standards for transparent, asset-backed digital currencies, the Trump administration can ensure that they run on regulated rails, rather than in the shadows.

Fourth, Trump is committed to ensuring America’s global AI dominance. As it stands, his administration’s strategy neglects a crucial point: Fragmentation would limit the scale of any player’s dominance. By using its G20 presidency to advance “high-trust interoperability,” balancing openness with security, the Trump administration could prevent the AI sector (and the digital economy more broadly) from splintering into competing inefficient blocs.

Fifth, the Trump administration emphasizes building “resilient mineral supply networks.” Through “investment-for-access” deals with partners in Africa and Latin America, the US could, in principle, secure supply chains without replicating the extractive dynamics of the West’s colonial past.

There are other areas where, with the right reframing, the global community could change the Trump administration’s stance. For starters, Trump has slashed US foreign aid. But such assistance can build markets for US exports, make value chains more secure and resilient, generate growth, and reduce migration pressure.

Similarly, the Trump administration eschews climate action. But given its technological legacy, the US is better equipped to “win” on clean manufacturing than in cheap and dirty production. A fair carbon border adjustment mechanism, underpinned by G20 cooperation on emissions accounting, would enable the US to make the most of its comparative advantage without being undercut by carbon-intensive competitors.

There might even be a way to get Trump on board with a coordinated G20 crackdown on illicit finance and “shadow markets.” While his policies have so far largely benefited the wealthy, often at the expense of many who voted for him, his handling of the economy has emerged as a major political vulnerability ahead of this year’s midterm elections. Pushing forward regulations on cross-border capital flows would restore faith in global capitalism and enhance stability, thereby protecting American savers from external contagion.

Finally, Trump’s rejection of America’s traditional role as the world’s “insurer of last resort” could be converted into support for a “global insurance architecture,” funded through risk-pooling. Such a system would enable the US to share the burden of systemic shocks without abdicating its seat at the head of the table.

This is admittedly a highly optimistic scenario, maybe even wishful thinking. This year could likely bring a grievance-driven G20 presidency that does nothing to improve the prospects of the US or the world. But, if Trump embraces even some of the opportunities described here, the man who suggested renaming American football might just end up rewriting the rules of the global economy.

Vera Songwe & Bernice Lee

Vera Songwe, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is founder and chair of the Liquidity and Sustainability Facility and co-chair of the Expert Review on Debt, Nature, and Climate. Bernice Lee is a distinguished fellow at Chatham House. The views expressed here are the writers' own. — Ed.

(Project Syndicate)