Crossing the valley of transition in the second year of the Lee Jae Myung administration

Some in the ruling camp appear to prioritize political advantage over democratic norms. Even if the Lee administration achieves policy successes in its second year, any democratic regression would cast a long shadow over those gains.

Choi Hoon

The author is a senior columnist at the JoongAng Ilbo.

The Lee Jae Myung administration enters its second year with the new year. In politics, this is often the most dynamic and consequential phase of a presidency, when the trajectory of a government is set. Those who navigate it well tend to complete their term with relative stability, while those who stumble often slide into lame-duck status and decline.

President Lee Jae Myung delivers a New Year’s address at a reception at the Blue House in Seoul on Jan. 2. [THE BLUE HOUSE]

Why does the second year matter so much? In the first year, a new administration benefits from a honeymoon with public opinion and the media, fueled by expectations and by reactions against the previous government’s missteps. In Korea’s case, much of the past year was consumed by investigations into former president Yoon Suk Yeol’s declaration of martial law, extending for seven months. President Lee’s distinctive style also drew attention, encouraging a period of relatively generous observation. It was a time shaped by low comparative standards, reflected in the sentiment that “anything is better than Yoon Suk Yeol.” Prime Minister Kim Min-seok’s remark that “some say President Lee Jae Myung’s five-year term is too short” can be read as a product of this first-year illusion.

The second year is when public “expectations” turn into “evaluations.” After crossing a year of turmoil together, voters reassess the administration they chose with a cooler eye. In Korea, every government has seen its approval ratings fall in the second year. Yoon’s administration, which began with 52 percent support, dropped to 24 percent in its second year. Moon Jae-in, who started with approval ratings in the 70 to 80 percent range, fell to 47 percent. Roh Moo-hyun and Park Geun-hye both saw early approval ratings of 60 percent and 44 percent, respectively, plunge to 33 percent by their second year.

This is not uniquely Korean. In the United States, midterm elections held every two years serve as a referendum on the president and often result in losses for the ruling party. Since Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1934, the governing party has won only three out of 23 midterms. In France, once-powerful presidents such as Nicolas Sarkozy, François Hollande and Emmanuel Macron all saw approval ratings fall sharply in their second year, dropping from the low to mid-60s to 40 percent for Macron, 13 percent for Hollande and 30 percent for Sarkozy.

The common cause has often been overconfidence in the first year, leading to misjudgment, unilateralism and arrogance. In his second year, Yoon abruptly escalated rhetoric in an Aug. 15 speech, warning of “anti-state forces obsessed with communist totalitarianism.” In October, his push to expand medical school admissions by 2,000 crossed a point of no return. The Moon administration also faced backlash when minimum wage hikes, shorter working hours and heavier real estate taxes were introduced in the first year, with side effects on livelihoods in the second. Instead of reflection, the government pressed ahead, culminating in the Sept. 13 real estate measures that helped pave the way for a change of administration. Roh, buoyed by confidence, openly urged support for the ruling party ahead of parliamentary elections early in his second year and was impeached.

The second year is not always bleak. Of Korea’s eight directly elected presidents, six saw stock markets rise during their second year, including Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak and Yoon. Sharp declines occurred only under Park Geun-hye in 2014, following the Sewol ferry disaster, and under Moon in 2018, when capital flowed into surging real estate. With more than 14 million retail investors, market sentiment is a critical political variable. Stock prices have again risen early this year, making the second year a test for the Lee administration’s ability to restore economic momentum, strengthen core manufacturing sectors such as semiconductors, automobiles and biotech and manage high inflation and a weak currency.

Another second-year risk is corruption. It often takes root in blind spots around the president, involving aides, associates or family members. Typically incubated in the first year, it erupts in the second. Allegations involving former first lady Kim Keon Hee, including luxury gifts, originated between March and September 2022 but surfaced later. Choi Soon-sil emerged from the shadows around Park in her second year, with preferential treatment for her daughter becoming clear by year’s end. Moon faced controversy in his second year over his son-in-law’s employment at Thai Eastar Jet. Such patterns reflect an institutional lag: Power peaks while oversight by opposition parties, civil society and the media temporarily weakens.

A bill to revise the Information and Communications Network Act aimed at curbing false and manipulated information is passed under the Democratic Party’s leadership at a plenary session of an extraordinary National Assembly on Dec. 24, 2025. Seats of the opposition People Power Party are empty. [YONHAP]

Beyond the second-year syndrome, the most serious concern facing the current administration is the potential erosion of democracy. Hardline lawmakers in the ruling party have pushed legislation that critics say undermines the separation of powers and press freedom. Following the law establishing a special tribunal for insurrection cases, the government advanced amendments to the Information and Communications Network Act, imposing punitive damages of up to five times the harm under the banner of combating false information. Critics argue the real effect is to chill free expression and suppress criticism of power, contradicting democratic principles such as those enshrined in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. State Department’s recent statement expressing “serious concern” reflects these worries.

Korea is now passing through what can be called a “valley of transition,” a phase democracies often experience during consolidation. After the previous administration’s martial law shock deepened divisions in democracy, this should be a time for recovery. Yet some in the ruling camp appear to prioritize political advantage over democratic norms. Even if the Lee administration achieves policy successes in its second year, any democratic regression would cast a long shadow over those gains. Governments are finite. The enduring value is the democratic republic itself. The hope for the new year is that reflection and restraint guide the administration through this decisive phase.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.