Once again, ‘autonomy camp vs. alliance camp’ — an astonishingly idle family feud

What ultimately matters is that prolonged infighting will translate into losses for national interests. Constructive disagreement must not be allowed to devolve into destructive conflict.

Yoo Jee-hye

The author is the head of the diplomatic and security news department at the JoongAng Ilbo.

In August 2017, President Moon Jae-in received his first policy briefing from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification at the Foreign Ministry complex in Doryeom-dong, central Seoul. Yet the scene unfolded in an unexpected way. The session was not moderated by the ministry’s chief policy planning officer, as protocol would normally dictate.

Chung Dong-young (left), minister of unification, speaks during a joint policy briefing by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Overseas Koreans Agency) and the Ministry of Unification at the Government Complex Seoul Annex on Dec. 19. To his right is Cho Hyun. [YONHAP]

That absence was no coincidence. The official in question traced his notoriety back to the Roh Moo-hyun administration, when he stood at the center of what later came to be framed as the clash between the so-called “alliance camp” and the “autonomy camp.” During negotiations over the relocation of the U.S. military base in Yongsan, a U.S. bureau director at the then Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade was reported to have referred to aides at the presidential National Security Council as “Taliban,” venting frustration with the government’s approach to the United States. A Foreign Ministry official passed the remark to the presidential office. The same official later resurfaced, a decade on, as the Foreign Ministry’s policy planning chief in August 2017.

“Why is that man sitting there?” That, according to accounts from the time, was the reaction of several figures from the Blue House’s so-called “586 generation” when they spotted him seated in the back row during the confirmation hearing for Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha. In the end, another senior official stepped in to moderate the briefing. Before long, the sidelined policy chief left public service altogether.

In hindsight, the episode was a prelude to a series of ordeals faced by the diplomatic line throughout the Moon administration.

In April 2019, a political counselor at the South Korean Embassy in Washington was accused of leaking details of conversations between the Korean and U.S. presidents to an opposition lawmaker. A chain of disciplinary actions followed, effectively paralyzing the embassy’s political functions for a time. Within government circles, many believed the Blue House had long viewed the Foreign Ministry as the source of rumors about strains in the alliance following the February 2019 Hanoi summit between the United States and North Korea, which ended without an agreement. The counselor was dismissed, the harshest possible penalty. Three years later, a court ruled the punishment excessive and ordered the dismissal overturned.

The Foreign Ministry was also repeatedly bypassed. In September 2020, after a South Korean fisheries official was killed by North Korean forces in the West Sea, National Security Office chief Suh Hoon convened a ministerial meeting — without inviting Foreign Minister Kang. In August 2019, in response to Japan’s economic retaliation against Korea, the government announced its decision to terminate the General Security of Military Information Agreement, a bilateral military intelligence-sharing agreement between Korea and Japan. The move was decided at a standing meeting of the presidential National Security Council that Kang did not attend. Instead, then-First Vice Foreign Minister Cho Sei-young filled in.

Officials known for their deep experience with Washington were effectively frozen out during successive personnel reshuffles. The stated rationale — to curb excessive concentration of power within the North America bureau and dismantle elite insularity — sounded reasonable. In practice, critics argue, it dealt a serious blow to Korea’s capacity for U.S.-focused diplomacy.

Recently, the old “autonomy camp versus alliance camp” framing has resurfaced after the Ministry of Unification was excluded from consultations between Seoul and Washington on North Korea policy, even as the ministry declared it would pursue direct engagement with Pyongyang. Given today’s unforgiving security environment, the very debate feels strikingly out of touch. Can U.S. assessments that place a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the 2026-27 timeframe really be considered irrelevant to Korea? And when Beijing applies sweeping pressure on Japan following the Japanese prime minister’s remarks about a Taiwan contingency, it also serves as a warning that Korea could be next.

Concerns only deepen when figures associated with the autonomy camp raise their voices as if on cue, immediately after Seoul and Washington conclude tariff and security negotiations. The joint fact sheet released after the recent Korea-U.S. summit is not an endpoint but a starting line. Flagship issues that may define the legacy of President Lee Jae Myung — including the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines and expanded rights to enrich and reprocess nuclear fuel — now enter their most consequential phase. This is no time for an internal turf war over who leads North Korea policy or who gets to face Washington.

Equally ill-judged is the spectacle of former and current unification ministers openly venting dissatisfaction with Kevin Kim, the U.S. lead negotiator on inter-Korean policy and the acting U.S. ambassador in Seoul. Kim is widely regarded in Washington as a capable official trusted by the Trump administration and a Korea hand who frequently cites Korea as a model ally. Attacking a figure who could prove a valuable partner at critical moments amounts to a self-inflicted wound. Dismissing his emphasis on maintaining sanctions by arguing that “President Donald Trump thinks differently from working-level officials” is a textbook case of selective interpretation.

Jeong Yeon-doo, left, vice minister for diplomatic strategy and intelligence at the Foreign Ministry, holds talks with acting U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Kevin Kim at the Foreign Ministry in Seoul on Dec. 16, to coordinate their North Korea policy. [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS]

There are signs, however, that Lee Jae Myung may chart a somewhat different course from Moon. At his first policy briefing, Moon stressed the “sense of ownership” and “leading role” of the Ministry of Unification, leaving little doubt about where he stood. The referee had effectively chosen a side from the outset.

Lee also highlighted the ministry’s role at his first briefing, but he stopped short of explicitly backing either camp. When calls emerged — long championed by autonomy advocates — for constitutional revision to institutionalize a “peaceful two-state theory” on the Korean Peninsula, Lee drew a clear line. “Policy must be grounded in reality,” he said.

What ultimately matters is that prolonged infighting will translate into losses for national interests. Constructive disagreement must not be allowed to devolve into destructive conflict. Korea cannot afford to waste another five years on such sterile arguments.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.