[Wang Son-taek] What Kim Jong-un wants

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s address to the Supreme People’s Assembly on Sunday was an unusually significant foreign-policy speech, with nearly half devoted to external relations. Unlike many routine domestic policy reports, this speech clearly laid out Pyongyang’s position on the United States, South Korea and the future of the Korean Peninsula. For analysts and policymakers, it offers a rare opportunity to gauge Kim’s strategic thinking.

The most striking part of Kim’s address was his implicit offer to reopen dialogue with Washington, but strictly on his own terms. Kim made clear that any talks could not be based on an agenda of denuclearization. Kim likely understands that Trump still longs for a major diplomatic spectacle, one that could earn him a Nobel Peace Prize. By dangling the prospect of another summit while ruling out denuclearization, Kim is attempting to shift the baseline — to normalize North Korea’s nuclear status as a starting point for negotiations. From Pyongyang’s perspective, this speech represents one more step toward making its nuclear arsenal an irreversible asset.

Another notable feature of the speech was Kim’s uncompromising stance toward South Korea. He devoted considerable time to explaining why dialogue with Seoul was off the table. He accused President of South Korea Lee Jae Myung of inheriting the same "absorption unification" schemes of previous presidents and continuing hostile military exercises with Washington. However, Kim’s language was unusually detailed and logical rather than merely vitriolic. This shows that he is paying close attention to Lee’s policies. While his statement that “there will be no sitting down with South Korea” sounds categorical, the very act of issuing such a carefully reasoned critique may signal that Pyongyang still sees value in managing, not abandoning, inter-Korean relations.

A deeper reading of the speech suggests that Kim’s goal was not simply to pronounce his policy positions on diplomatic issues but to shape the strategic environment. Much of the message seems designed as psychological warfare aimed at Washington and Seoul. Kim sent a well-calibrated signal to Trump, banking on that the American and South Korean media would focus on the possibility of another summit rather than on his firm rejection of denuclearization. This asymmetry benefits Pyongyang: It shifts public discussion toward diplomacy while eroding pressure for regime-ending concessions.

At the same time, Kim left a small opening for negotiations. One key passage noted that "as long as external threats exist, we must continue to strengthen our military power." In North Korean discourse, such conditional phrasing implies that if those threats were removed, military policy could change. This is the closest Kim came to acknowledging that arms control or a phased freeze could be on the table — provided the security environment changes. In short, Kim is not rejecting diplomacy but attempting to redefine its terms. His strategy appears to be to narrow the denuclearization agenda to its smallest possible scope before entering any future summit.

Equally revealing is Kim’s updated assessment of the international order. Since 2022, he has frequently framed global politics in terms of a new Cold War: US-China rivalry, Russia’s war in Ukraine and the emergence of competing blocs. At one point, Pyongyang even encouraged a formal anti-US solidarity with Beijing and Moscow. Yet this latest speech downplays bloc confrontation. Kim now seems less interested in building an anti-American coalition and more focused on leveraging Washington’s unpredictability — particularly Trump’s transactional style — to improve North Korea’s bargaining position.

His participation in Beijing’s Victory Day military parade and meetings with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin highlighted his ability to engage with China and Russia, but his September speech indicates that he did not exclude a direct deal with the United States that advances North Korea’s economic goals. This shift signals a partial retreat from a “new Cold War” diplomacy and a return to diplomacy that centers on bilateral negotiation with Washington.

Roughly half of Kim’s speech listed domestic accomplishments in industry, agriculture, housing and public health. While the details were standard propaganda, the tone suggested growing confidence in the regime’s ability to govern despite economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation. By presenting economic progress as irreversible and sustainable, Kim reinforced the message that North Korea is not negotiating out of desperation. Instead, Pyongyang seeks to bargain from a position of strength, trading its growing nuclear leverage for tangible benefits without surrendering its core deterrent.

Kim’s performance was a master class in message control. He projected willingness to meet Trump while simultaneously slamming the door on denuclearization. He rejected dialogue with Seoul in absolute terms but still demonstrated careful attention to South Korean politics, hinting that circumstances could change if Seoul abandoned what he sees as hostile intentions. For policymakers in Seoul, this dual message is both a warning and an opportunity. The warning is that North Korea will not disarm, at least not under current conditions. The opportunity lies in the fact that Kim appears eager to shape the next phase of diplomacy, meaning that proactive engagement could still influence his calculus.

Kim Jong Un’s September address should be read not just as a static policy statement but as the start of a new round of diplomatic maneuvering. His goal is to reframe the conversation: from complete denuclearization to arms control. For the United States, this presents a dilemma. Ignoring the speech risks ceding the initiative to address the North Korean issues, but engaging without careful planning risks legitimizing North Korea’s nuclear status prematurely. For South Korea, the task is even more delicate: to maintain deterrence and alliance coordination while keeping the door open for eventual talks that reduce tension. Ultimately, Kim seeks recognition of North Korea as a de facto nuclear power — but even absent such recognition, he aims to extract concessions. Whether the next chapter of Korean Peninsula diplomacy leads to stability or renewed tension will depend on how skillfully Seoul and Washington manage their response.

Wang Son-taek

Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.