Donald Trump is not anti-Korea — he is anti-strategy

Rebuilding disciplined policy processes will be difficult. But for Korea and the United States there is no credible alternative.

Michael Green

The author is the CEO of the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and the Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Koreans were understandably outraged and confused when, just weeks after President Lee Jae Myung’s constructive meeting with President Donald Trump at the White House, U.S. authorities arrested more than 300 Korean workers at a Hyundai plant in Georgia, shackled them and flew them back to Korea on a chartered plane. The episode did not reflect animus toward Korea so much as a breakdown of strategic discipline inside the U.S. government.

Grand strategy requires reconciling competing goals. The U.S. National Security Council, created in 1947, exists to force such reconciliation by coordinating State, Defense, Treasury and intelligence so that the president receives coherent options. I served on the NSC staff in the George W. Bush administration. My job was to coordinate and argue with colleagues responsible for trade, human rights, nonproliferation and defense, and to explain trade-offs for the president. That system forces competing priorities to fit into a single national strategy.

Detainees are made to stand against a bus before being handcuffed, during a raid by federal agents where about 300 Koreans were among 475 people arrested at the site of a $4.3 billion project by Hyundai Motor and LG Energy Solution to build batteries for electric cars in Savannah, Georgia on Sept. 4. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

President Trump’s second term has shown little appetite for that process. Across his careers as a businessman, a reality television star and a politician, he has repeatedly announced contradictory promises and rearranged them as circumstances demanded. Where most leaders would shelter staff, allies and investors from such unpredictability, Trump institutionalizes it. That approach can be politically effective because it preserves flexibility and keeps opponents guessing, but it damages American national power when strategic logic is required.

The fallout from ad hoc decision-making is not limited to Korea. India, judged strategically important in Washington’s effort to balance China, expected steady engagement after the first Trump term. Prime Minister Narendra Modi enjoyed a close personal rapport with Trump, and outreach to the Indian diaspora in the United States counted as domestic political capital. Yet, Trump stunned Modi last month by slapping 50% tariffs on India. This was ostensibly because India is buying Russian oil, but is really because Trump is angry at Modi for not joining Pakistan in nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize for “ending” the India-Pakistan confrontation earlier this year. In fact, Trump did not end the conflict (though the United States played some diplomatic role), and Modi could not give him credit without a domestic backlash even if he had.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, from left, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping talk ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit at the Meijiang Convention and Exhibition Center in Tianjin, China, Monday, Sept. 1, 2025. [AP/YONHAP]

Given India’s strategic importance, one would have expected the NSC and the secretaries of state and defense to repair the damage. They could not do so without the support of a powerful White House faction led by Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller, who is strongly anti-immigration and skeptical of immigrant communities, including the Indian diaspora. The dispute pushed U.S.–India ties to levels of strain not seen in decades and harmed longer-term alignment.

Stephen Miller was also central to the Georgia raid. In June, he ordered Immigration and Customs Enforcement to raise daily arrest targets to roughly 3,000. To meet that quota, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) searched for large venues where many unauthorized workers could be detained at once, making big retail outlets and factory complexes prime targets. Reports indicate the Hyundai workers were operating in a gray area with their visas to keep production on schedule at a plant expected to support some 8,000 American jobs. That legal ambiguity made the workforce a tempting target for enforcement.

The Georgia operation should have been coordinated with Commerce, Treasury, the NSC and state officials in Georgia to weigh collateral damage to investment and to U.S. strategic interests in Asia. Instead, ICE carried out mass arrests without consultation, visibly shackling skilled workers and creating an image that pleased anti-immigrant supporters. The immediate political payoff for some domestic constituencies came at a strategic cost: foreign investors cooled, alliance confidence frayed, and Korea questioned the reliability of a partner that seemed to pursue short-term theatrics over long-term balance.

At a moment when China’s leader telegraphs hegemonic ambition through military parades and demonstrations of power, Washington must strengthen ties with partners such as India and Korea, not alienate them. Trump’s ad hoc tariff and immigration policies have already taken a political and economic toll at home. Public opinion and Congress remain broadly pro-alliance and pro-India, and these domestic constraints may curb the most reckless impulses in the White House.

It is hard to imagine Trump suddenly embracing patient bureaucratic coordination—he is nearly 80 years old, and his instincts favor spectacle over process. But externalities matter. Economic fallout from erratic tariffs, investor unease and congressional pressure will shape presidential choices. Even if the administration continues its unpredictable streak, these countervailing forces can nudge policy back toward continuity.

White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller speaks as U.S. President Donald Trump holds an executive order signing ceremony in the Oval Office of the White House, Aug. 25, in Washington. [AP/YONHAP]

Nevertheless, both governments must work to institutionalize the spirit of the August summit between Presidents Lee and Trump. They should build rapid consultation mechanisms among Commerce, Treasury, State and the NSC, agree on escalation protocols and maintain networks that flag actions likely to harm strategic interests. Rebuilding disciplined policy processes will be difficult. But for Korea and the United States, there is no credible alternative.

If they succeed, the alliance will be better able to deter coercion, preserve economic ties, and manage competition with China without unnecessary self-inflicted wounds.