Trump trade talks must prioritize Korea’s security

2025. 7. 24. 00:04
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Korea should not focus solely on the challenges posed by the current administration but instead aim to define a future vision for the U.S.-Korea alliance.

Cha Se-hyeon

The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.

With the Aug. 1 deadline for reciprocal tariffs set by the Donald Trump administration just days away, Korea faces a critical week of diplomacy. Japan, which had been informed of a potential 25 percent U.S. tariff — just like Korea — reached a compromise at 15 percent on July 22, signaling a tougher negotiating environment. The possibility that Trump might once again back down under pressure, as critics mocking him with the acronym TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out) have speculated, now seems remote.

Despite growing criticism worldwide that Trump’s pressure on allies amounts to a dismantling of traditional partnerships, the administration remains firm. Trump appears determined to reduce both the U.S. trade deficit, which reached $918.4 billion in 2024, and its global security commitments. Negotiations are entering a final phase, shifting from general threats to specific trade-offs, as countries attempt to lower their assigned tariff rates through direct give-and-take.

Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo, right, shakes hands with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer during a meeting in Washington on July 5. [YONHAP]

So far, five countries have reached agreements with Washington: Japan (15 percent), Britain (10 percent), Vietnam (20 percent), Indonesia (19 percent) and the Philippines (19 percent). Other parties, including the European Union (30 percent), Korea (25 percent) and Taiwan (32 percent), must now navigate more complex negotiations involving trade, investment and security.

Korea’s response has been swift. The government has dispatched several high-level officials to Washington this week, including National Security Office Director Wi Sung-lac; Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy Kim Jung-kwan; Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Koo Yoon-cheol Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo. Their presence underlines the gravity of the situation.

Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy Kim Jung-kwan delivers opening remarks during a Cabinet meeting presided over by President Lee Jae Myung at the presidential office in Yongsan District, central Seoul, on July 22. [YONHAP]

According to reports, Washington’s demands include greater market access for American agricultural products like rice and beef, the repeal of Korea’s online platform regulations, participation in the Alaska LNG project, creation of a U.S.-focused investment fund, and increased defense spending and cost-sharing for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). What remains unclear, however, is what Korea is prepared to concede—and what it seeks in return. While confidentiality is a natural part of negotiation, the stakes are high, with implications for the economy, national security, and citizens’ livelihoods.

Given what is known about Washington’s demands, several principles should guide Korea’s approach. Above all, talks involving the U.S.-Korea alliance and North Korea’s denuclearization must prioritize Korea’s national security. NATO's recent decision to increase defense spending — raising military budgets to nearly 5 percent of GDP in response to Russian threats — offers a precedent. Direct military spending will account for 3.5 percent.

The Indo-Pacific region is emerging as a new geopolitical flashpoint, marked by growing threats from China, Russia and North Korea. Preparedness is essential to deterrence. In this context, Trump’s demand for greater defense spending is not unreasonable. Korea’s 2025 defense budget stands at 61.6 trillion won ($44.6 billion), about 2.32 percent of GDP. To reach 3.5 percent by 2035, annual increases of around 5.5 to 6 percent would be necessary, based on Korea’s projected growth rate of 2 percent. Notably, under the Moon Jae-in administration, defense spending rose by 7 to 8 percent annually from 2018 to 2020. Any increase in Korea’s share of USFK costs could be handled within this broader framework.

On trade, a pragmatic compromise may be advisable. Ryu Jin, chairman of the Federation of Korean Industries and a prominent figure in Korea’s business community, recently told reporters that Korea should “give where it can, even if it means short-term losses,” in order to secure a more stable future. He added that Korea could emerge as a “head starter” if it negotiates better terms than competitors like China, the EU or Japan. However, any concessions must be accompanied by policies that mitigate harm to affected industries and individuals.

Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba speaks to media after U.S. President Donald Trump announced a trade framework with Japan at the prime minister's office in Tokyo on July 23. [AP/YONHAP]

While Trump’s current term lasts another three and a half years, negotiators must also take a long-term view. The U.S.-China rivalry is likely to define the global order for decades, regardless of who occupies the White House. Korea should not focus solely on the challenges posed by the current administration but instead aim to define a future vision for the U.S.-Korea alliance.

In doing so, officials must distinguish between reversible and irreversible commitments. Increased defense spending or investment pledges can be adjusted over time. In contrast, reductions in the USFK troop presence — currently around 28,500 — or changes to wartime operational control would be far more difficult to reverse. Decisions that could permanently alter the nature of the U.S.-Korea military alliance must be approached with caution.

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.

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